Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Public Management and Policy Dissertations
6-25-2008

Uncompensated Care Provision and the Economic Behavior of
Hospitals: the Influence of the Regulatory Environment
Lei Zhang
Georgia State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/pmap_diss
Part of the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons

Recommended Citation
Zhang, Lei, "Uncompensated Care Provision and the Economic Behavior of Hospitals: the Influence of the
Regulatory Environment." Dissertation, Georgia State University, 2008.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/1359677

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Public Management and Policy Dissertations by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.

UNCOMPENSATED CARE PROVISION AND THE ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR OF HOSPITALS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

A Dissertation
Presented to
The Academic Faculty

by

Lei Zhang

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy in the
School of Public Policy/Andrew Young School of Policy Studies

Georgia Institute of Technology/Georgia State University
DECEMBER, 2008

UNCOMPENSATED CARE PROVISON AND THE ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR OF HOSPITALS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

Approved by:
Dr. Paul G. Farnham, Advisor
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Georgia State University

Dr. Patricia Ketsche
Robinson School of Business
Georgia State University

Dr. William Custer
Robinson School of Business
Georgia State University

Dr. Karen J. Minyard
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Georgia State University

Dr. Shiferaw Gurmu
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Georgia State University

Dr. Douglas Noonan
School of Public Policy
Georgia Institute of Technology
Date Approved: 11/11/2008

THIS DISSERTATION IS DEDICATED TO MY FAMILY…

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply indebted to many people who have offered tremendous help during
my doctoral years. I cannot imagine how lonely this long journey would be without their
support, both professionally and personally.
I must first express my deepest gratitude to my dissertation committee: Dr. Paul
G. Farnham, Dr. Karen Minyard, Dr. Patricia Ketsche, Dr. William Custer, Dr. Shiferaw
Gurmu, and Dr. Douglas Noonan. My dissertation chair, Dr. Farnham, deserves special
recognition for his guidance, understanding, patience and, most of all, his friendship
during my dissertation process. Not only was he readily available to me, but he always
read and responded to each draft of my work more quickly and carefully than I could
have hoped. Dr. Patricia Ketsche and Dr. William Custer gave me the inspiration to
develop this dissertation. Their extensive knowledge, keen insights and commitment to
the highest standards motivated me to achieve excellence. Dr. Karen Minyard has
assisted me in so many ways during this journey. None of this work would have been
possible without her mentorship. Dr. Shiferaw Gurmu, and Dr. Douglas Noonan also
contributed invaluably to this work. I deeply appreciate the time they devoted to
providing methodological expertise and critical comments in every phase of my work.
I owe a special note of gratitude to Dr. Donald Compton at Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) for his encouragement and support. I thank the faculty
members who provided contributions to my dissertation. In particular, I am extremely
grateful for the assistance, generosity, and advice I received from Dr. Greg Lewis. His
help made it possible for me to accomplish this endeavor. Additionally, much

iv

appreciation goes out to my long-term friends and colleagues: Rayna Stoycheva, Dr.
Ignacio Navarro, Dr. Kwaw Adam, Dr. Hai (David) Guo, and Taeyhun Jung for their
insights and, more importantly, emotional support. I enjoyed every minute working with
them. I extend many thanks to Mei Zhou, Glenn Landers, as well as other friends and
colleagues from the Georgia Health Policy Center for their assistance with the data.
I would like to extend special thanks to my parents, Qingyi Zhang and Jinli Liu,
for their unending encouragement throughout my life and for being a constant source of
support. I would also like to thank my husband, Binjian Sun, for his unwavering love
and patience. He helps to keep me optimistic whenever I am faced with great challenges.
Without his support, I would never have been able to accomplish as much as I have in my
research.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

iv

LIST OF TABLES

ix

LIST OF FIGURES

xi

SUMMARY

xii

CHAPTER
1

2

INTRODUCTION

1

Scope of the Research

5

Dissertation Overview

6

LITERATURE REVIEW

7

Trends in Uncompensated Care Provision

7

Theory of Regulation

11

Hospital Regulation

12

Certificate-of-Need

14

Any-Willing-Provider and Freedom-of-Choice Law

17

Hospital Rate Settings and Uncompensated Care Pools

19

Hospital Conversion Regulation

21

Community Benefit Requirement

22

Summary of Literature Review

24

3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, TYPOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES

27

Theoretical Framework

27

Typology

34

Hypotheses

35

vi

4 DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL SPECIFICATION

41

Empirical Specification

41

Data

42

Construction of the Sample

43

Dependent Variable

49

Regulatory Variables

51

Control Variables

53

Descriptive Statistics

62

5 ESTIMATION AND RESULTS

76

Estimation

76

Three Estimation Approaches

77

Cluster Correlated Errors

83

A Test for Endogeneity

84

Results

85

6 CONCLUSION

109

Summary

109

Policy Implications

112

Study Limitations and Future Research

115

APPENDIX A: Regulatory Variations

120

APPENDIX B: Market Definition

122

APPENDIX C: Sensitivity Analysis: Market Defined by Patient Flow vs. County 124
APPENDIX D: Rural/Urban Continuum Codes

128

APPENDIX E:

Distribution of Hospitals by Ownership Types

129

APPENDIX F:

Comparing Sample with U.S. Hospitals

131

APPENDIX G: Results from the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Estimation 132

vii

REFERENCES

133

VITA

141

viii

LIST OF TABLES
Page
Table 1:

Comparative Static Results for Nonprofit and For-profit Model

46

Table 2:

Variations of Regulations by Study States

58

Table 3.1: Percent of Missing Values for Technology Intensity by State/Year

61

Table 3.2: Percent of Missing Values for ER by State/Year

61

Table 4:

Intensity Index: Dimensions for Community Benefit Requirement Laws

67

Table 5:

Predicted Effects on Uncompensated Care Provision

74

Table 6:

Variables and Their Definitions

76

Table 7:

Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample

77

Table 8.1: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample by Hospital Ownership Status
(Public)

79

Table 8.2: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample by Hospital Ownership Status
(Nonprofit)

80

Table 8.3: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample by Hospital Ownership Status (Forprofit)
81
Table 9:

Descriptive Statistics for the Final Study Sample by Nonprofit/For-profit
Status
85

Table 10: Comparing Hospitals in Final Study Sample and in U.S. in 2003

86

Table 11.1: Nonprofit Hospital Distribution by Regulatory Intensity: Certificate-of-Need
87
Table 11.2: Nonprofit Hospital Distribution by Regulatory Intensity: Community Benefit
Requirement
87
Table 11.3: Nonprofit Hospital Distribution by Regulatory Intensity: Uncompensated
Care Pool
87
Table 11.3: Nonprofit Hospital Distribution by Regulatory Intensity: Uncompensated
Care Pool
87
Table 12.1: For-profit Hospital Distribution by Regulatory Intensity: Certificate-of-Need
88
ix

Table 12.2: For-profit Hospital Distribution by Regulatory Intensity: Community Benefit
Requirement
88
Table 12.3: For-profit Hospital Distribution by Regulatory Intensity: Uncompensated
Care Pool
88
Table 13: List of Time Varying/Invariant and Endogenous/exogenous Variables

95

Table 14: Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroskedasticity

97

Table 15.1: Hausman Test for Nonprofit Hospitals: FE vs. GLS

99

Table 15.2: Hausman Test for Nonprofit Hospitals: FE vs. HTIV

100

Table 15.3: Hausman Test for For-profit Hospitals: FE vs. GLS

101

Table 15.4: Hausman Test for For-profit Hospitals: FE vs. HTIV

102

Table 16: GLS Results for Hospital Provision of Uncompensated Care

105

Table 17: HTIV Results for Hospital Provision of Uncompensated Care

106

Table 18.1: Total effects of Regulations on Nonprofit Hospital Provision of
Uncompensated Care (GLS)

114

Table 18.2: Total effects of Regulations on For-profit Hospital Provision of
Uncompensated Care (GLS)

114

Table 19.1: GLS: Comparing Estimates w/ and w/o Other Policy or Interactions
(Nonprofit)

116

Table 19.2: GLS: Comparing Estimates w/ and w/o Other Policy or Interactions (Forprofit)
116
Table 20: Summary of Effects on Uncompensated Care Provision

x

121

LIST OF FIGURES
Page
Figure 1: Study vs. Non-study States

44

Figure 2: Hospital Provision of Uncompensated Care 2002

69

Figure 3: Percent of Uncompensated Care Admissions by Ownership Types 2002

69

xi

SUMMARY

This dissertation project examines the effect of various state regulations such as
Certificate-of-Need (CON) regulation, uncompensated care pools and community benefit
requirement laws on hospital provision of uncompensated care and analyzes both forprofit and non-profit hospitals’ responsiveness to the regulatory environment. The
analysis of these regulations uses panel data econometric methods for a sample of
hospitals in 17 states from 2002 to 2004. This study overcomes the limits of previous
research that focused primarily on the effect of a single regulation in a given state. It uses
three estimation methods: pooled Ordinary Least Squares (pooled OLS), random effects
generalized least squares (GLS) and Hausman Taylor instrumental variable (HTIV) to
obtain the parameter estimates. Weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each
method, we interpret results based on the cross-validation of the GLS and HTIV
estimates. Findings suggest that nonprofit and for-profit hospitals respond to some policy
instruments similarly and others differently. For example, both nonprofit and for-profit
hospitals respond to CON laws by increasing their uncompensated care provision.
However, they respond to policy incentives such as community benefit requirement laws
differently. Furthermore, regulatory interactions are found to significantly influence the
uncompensated care provision by both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. The dissertation
helps policy makers formulate strategies to create incentives to enhance access to care for
the economically disadvantaged. For example, implementing CON and providing public
subsidies at the same time may offer better access to care for the uninsured than

xii

implementing either regulation alone. However, community benefit requirement laws do
not appear to expand the amount of uncompensated care provided by nonprofit hospitals.

xiii

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

A continued decline in the share of the population with health insurance coverage
combined with movement to decreased reimbursement for hospitals have caused renewed
concern about access to health care for the underinsured and uninsured. Hospital
uncompensated care, a primary source of care for the indigent, has been declining even
though the demand for such care continues to grow. According to a Census Bureau report,
the number of uninsured has risen considerably over the years. In less than a decade, the
percentage of people without health insurance coverage rose from 14.2 percent in 2000 to
15.8 percent in 2006, that is, 47 million people (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor et al. 2006;
Census 2008). This trend has resulted in substantial stress for public and nonprofit
teaching hospitals that have played a central role in providing access to care for the
indigent. American Hospital Association (AHA) statistics show that hospitals provided
almost $29 billion in uncompensated care in 2005, which comprised about six percent of
U.S. acute care hospitals’ revenue (AHA 2006). In the face of growing fiscal pressures,
this burden has started to jeopardize the financial solvency of some hospitals, and has
consequently exerted significant impact on access to care for those who need it the most.
Because state regulatory policies have greatly influenced the level of
uncompensated care and the ability of hospitals to finance such care, this study examines
the impact of such policies on hospital provision of uncompensated care and analyzes
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hospitals’ relative responsiveness to the regulatory environment *. Specifically, the study
will seek to answer the following research questions: (1) How do regulatory
environments affect hospitals that differ by type of ownership? (2) Do regulatory
interactions make individual regulations more or less effective?
Answers to these research questions are important because they will help policy
makers formulate strategies to improve hospital financing of uncompensated care and
create incentives to enhance access to care for the uninsured. For instance, in light of the
recent debate over the new Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ruling requiring nonprofit
hospitals to report community benefits, it is crucial for the policy makers to understand
the intended or unintended consequences of the existing state community benefit
requirement laws and whether they influence other similar regulations. In addition,
alternative interventions might be developed to protect the safety net hospitals †, which
are often the last resort for care for the uninsured and underinsured, by redistributing the
burden of uncompensated care to financially relieve these providers. Furthermore, if
regulations are jointly effective in increasing hospital provision of uncompensated care,
policy makers targeting at expanding access to care for the uninsured should consider
designing more complex regulatory strategies. If interaction among regulations reduces
the effectiveness of an individual regulation, the existing regulatory environment should

*

Note that we are not including federal regulations in the current study due to a lack of variation across
states. Our main interest lies in state’s regulatory variations.
†
These are hospitals, either public or private, that have a legal obligation or a commitment to provide direct
health care services to the uninsured or underinsured Dalton, et al. (2005). "Survival strategies for
Michigan's health care safety net providers." Health Serv Res 40(3): 923-40..
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be carefully examined when new regulations are designed. Thus, the investigation of
multiple regulations is crucial to policy design (Antel, Ohsfeldt and Becker, 1995).
We adopt panel data econometric methods for a sample of 2,235 nonprofit and
295 for-profit hospitals in 17 states from 2002 to 2004. This study uses a comprehensive
dataset that includes information obtained from three major data sources: the American
Hospital Association (AHA) annual survey of hospitals, the Area Resource File (ARF)
and the State Inpatient Database (SID) of the Health Care Utilization Project (HCUP). It
overcomes the limits of previous research that focused primarily on the effect of a single
regulation in a given state. It uses three estimation methods: pooled Ordinary Least
Squares (pooled OLS), random effects generalized least squares (GLS) and Hausman
Taylor instrumental variable (HTIV) to obtain the parameter estimates. Weighing the
advantages and disadvantages of each method, we interpret results based on the crossvalidation of the GLS and HTIV estimates.
Our findings suggest that nonprofit and for-profit hospitals respond to some
policy instruments similarly and others differently. In addition, we find significant
regulatory interactions. Sometimes the effect of a regulation bundle differs from that of
individual regulations. This result indicates that previous studies that failed to include
regulatory interactions tend to overestimate or misestimate the effect of single regulations.
Some important limitations need to be noted. Due to data unavailability, we do not have
real changes over time for some key variables that the HTIV model uses to construct
robust internal instruments. Additionally, our population adjustment of these variables,
though introducing within group variation, creates measurement errors that could bias our
estimates. Future research should focus on obtaining more data on these variables so that
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we could improve the HTIV estimations. Enhanced measures of regulatory intensity
using data that include information on primary/preventive care should also be used
improve our understanding of the mechanism by which these regulations affect hospital
uncompensated care provision.

4

Scope of the Research
In the current research, we focus on nonfederal, short-term general medical and
surgical hospitals. We exclude nursing homes, hospices, and home health care agencies
because they compete in a different market and are typically treated separately. We
further exclude federal hospitals for similar reasons.
We focus on differences in state regulatory environments for three reasons. First
and foremost, states are playing an increasingly significant role in regulating their
marketplaces. With the recent shifts toward a more state-centered form of federalism,
states have been encouraged to formulate and implement their own regulations to reflect
regional dynamics (Turnock and Atchison 2002). Second, failure to recognize regulatory
variations among states would lead to an incomplete understanding of regulation’s impact
on organizational behaviors (Anderson, Heyssel et al. 1993). Third, states have always
been an ideal laboratory for “natural experiments”. With the variation in the regulatory
environment among states, we are able to test theoretical models in a more scientific and
rigorous fashion, using a near-natural experiment approach (i.e., comparisons of
outcomes under different regulatory environments). To capture a state’s regulatory
environment, we include in our analysis a much broader scope of regulations than many
existing studies. These regulations include Certificate-of-Need (CON) laws, AnyWilling-Provider (AWP) or Freedom-of-Choice (FOC) regulation, ratesetting/uncompensated care pool regulation, state hospital conversion regulation, and
community benefit mandates. ‡

‡

Due to a lack of variations on AWP/FOC and state hospital conversion regulations in our data sample, we
do not empirically test the impact of these two regulations.

5

Dissertation Overview
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter Two first reviews literature on
hospital regulation and behavior, as well as hospital provision of uncompensated care. It
then summarizes the empirical studies and identifies gaps in the research.
Chapter Three discusses theoretical models of hospital behavior and
uncompensated care provision. The first section develops models of hospital behaviors in
response to exogenous changes. The next section presents hypotheses to be tested.
Chapter Four presents the methodology, empirical model, and data to be used in
the analysis. Chapter Five describes the estimation methodology and presents findings,
while Chapter Six concludes, discusses policy implications and study limitations, and
suggests directions for future research.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

Previous literature analyzing regulation’s impact on uncompensated care
provision largely emphasizes the effect of a single regulation without much focus on
sectoral differences or policy interactions. This chapter first reviews literature on
uncompensated care trends. It then explores motivations for government intervention and
the regulation of the hospital industry. This chapter then describes the specific regulations
under investigation and reviews relevant empirical studies. It concludes with a summary
of the literature and an evaluation of the gaps in prior research.
Trends in Uncompensated Care Provision
Health services researchers have been closely monitoring uncompensated care
trends since the early 1980s. They have generally found that between 1980 and 1990, the
relative cost of uncompensated care as a percentage of total revenue for all non-federal
acute care hospitals increased by about 20 percent, with much of the increase occurring in
the first half of the 1980s. The 1990s saw a reversed trend. Despite the fact that the
demand for uncompensated care continued to increase, the level of uncompensated care
generally declined throughout the 1990s (Atkinson, Helms et al. 1997; Cunningham and
Tu 1997; Mann, Melnick et al. 1997; GAO 2006). These studies also find that
uncompensated care has not been evenly distributed across hospitals and in fact has been
increasingly concentrated among a small number of hospitals. Public and nonprofit
teaching hospitals bear much of the uncompensated care burden. Some studies report a
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lower level of uncompensated care supply by for-profit hospitals when compared with
nonprofit and public/nonprofit teaching hospitals (Rosenau 2003). Some others fail to
show that there is significant performance difference between for-profit and nonprofit
hospitals on this criterion § (Rosenau 2003; Rosenau and Linder 2003).
For example, a 2006 General Accounting Office report (GAO 2006) reviewed
hospital uncompensated care provision by nonprofit, for-profit and government hospitals
in five states (California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, and Texas). Their statistics show that
government hospitals generally devoted the largest share of patient operating expenses to
uncompensated care. The nonprofit hospitals’ average percentages of uncompensated
care expenses were greater than for-profit hospitals in four of the five study states
(Florida, Georgia, Texas, and Indiana). In California, the report did not find significant
differences among the two hospital groups. In addition, within each hospital group, the
uncompensated care burden was generally concentrated in a small number of hospitals.
The authors of the report did not, however, control for any hospital or market
characteristics that might influence hospital provision of uncompensated care.
Another study released by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) expands on
the GAO’s findings (CBO, 2006). Using the same dataset, the CBO adopted multiple
regression techniques to adjust the differences between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals

§

The empirical literature examining other performance criteria such as cost, efficiency, diffusion of
technology, or quality of care among hospitals of different ownership types is not discussed here. For a
systematic evaluation of nonprofit vs. for-profit performance, please see Rosenau, P. V. (2003).
"Performance Evaluations of For-profit U.S. Hospitals Since 1980." Nonprofit Management and
Leadership 13(4): 401-423, Rosenau, P. V. and S. H. Linder (2003). "Two Decades of Research Comparing
For-profit and Nonprofit Health Provider Performance in the United States." Social Science Quarterly
84(2): 219-241..
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in uncompensated care provision due to hospital and market characteristics. They report
an adjusted difference of 0.6 percentage points in uncompensated care as a share of
operating expenses, with nonprofit hospitals slightly leading for-profit hospitals.
Schlesinger et al. (1997) used data from a 1987-1988 national survey of 915
psychiatric specialty and general hospitals to examine the impact of hospital ownership
and competition, as well as the interaction of these variables on access to hospital care for
the uninsured. Results from their Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions show that
controlling for some confounding covariates, nonprofit hospitals operating in 1988
provided significantly more uncompensated care than their for-profit counterparts.
However, when competition intensifies, such difference in the provision of
uncompensated care tends to disappear.
Another study by Norton and Staiger (1994) used the 1981 American Hospital
Association (AHA) annual survey of hospitals to compare the volume of uninsured
patients treated in nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. Employing an instrumental variable
approach, their study failed to find any significant ownership-related difference in the
number of uninsured patients served by nonprofit and for-profit hospitals when they are
located in the same market. However, they also found that for-profit hospitals often selfselect into better-insured markets to avoid those in need of charity care.
Banks, Paterson and Wendel (1997) examined nonprofit vs. for-profit hospital
response to exogenous shocks in term of their uncompensated care provision. They used
an unbalanced panel of non-Kaiser acute care hospitals in California from 1981-1989 to
test the hypotheses that nonprofit and for-profit hospitals react differently to exogenous
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shocks in the market when they make decisions to supply uncompensated care measured
as bad debt and charity care expenditures. The study results show that decreased
demand for hospital services is associated with an increase in the for-profit hospital
supply of uncompensated care, and a negative but insignificant change in the nonprofit
hospital supply of such care. Reduced community expectations as measured by the
percent of public hospitals in the market are negatively related to for-profit hospital
uncompensated care provision.
Using discharge data from California’s short-term acute care hospitals that were
operating from 1982-1988, Gruber (1994) investigates the impact of market
concentration on hospital provision of uncompensated care measured as bad debt and
charity care charges. Results show that hospitals in less concentrated areas reduced their
uncompensated care, relative to those in more concentrated areas. However, this study
did not directly test whether hospitals of different ownership types respond to market
concentration differently in terms of their uncompensated care provision due to limited
sample size (398 hospitals including public, for-profits and nonprofits). Instead, the study
shows that controlling for market concentration and other covariates, for-profit and
nonprofit hospitals’ supply of uncompensated care did not differ significantly.
In summary, the literature provides some evidence that nonprofit and for-profit
hospitals might behave differently in terms of their uncompensated care provision as well
as responses to the exogenous environment. This is relevant to our analysis of regulation
because if hospitals of different ownership types respond in different ways with regard to
their uncompensated care provision, they ought to be modeled differently and tested in
separate equations.
10

Theory of Regulation
In order to predict hospital responses to regulation or in other words, the impact
of regulation on hospital provision of uncompensated care, it is important to understand
motivations for states to intervene in private activities. There are mainly three lines of
theory that provides reasons for government interventions: the public interest theory, the
private interest theory and regulation for taxation.
The prevailing theory of regulation since Adam Smith has been known as the
“normative analysis as a positive theory” or NPT (Joskow and Noll 1981). It regarded
market failure as the motivating reason for the entry of regulation. Once established,
regulatory bodies were supposed to lessen or eliminate the inefficiencies engendered by
the market failure (Peltzman 1989). Since this theory is based on traditional welfare
economics, it implies that regulations are implemented to serve the public interest.
However, the weakness of this theory is its assumption that perfectly informed social
welfare maximizers are either managing the regulation or running the regulated
organizations (Winston 1993).
Private interest theory of regulation starts with the capture theory or CT. It states
that over time regulatory agencies are controlled by the industry pressing to pass
supportive regulations (Stigler 1971). In other words, regulation is designed to protect the
regulated firms from competition. It was later developed by Pelzman (1976) and Becker
(1983) into a general line of theory called the Chicago theory of regulation or the
economic theory of regulation (ET). Taken together, the private interest theory implies
that members of the regulated industry often form effective advocacy coalitions that are
able to influence policy making for their own protection.
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The taxation by regulation theory is developed mainly because neither public
interest theory or private interest theory is able to adequately explain the deliberate and
continued provision of many services by the regulated industry at lower rates and in
larger quantities than would be offered in an unregulated competitive or monopolistic
market (Posner 1971). This theory hence maintains that regulation is designed to realize
cross-subsidization. That is regulatory authorities may use cross-subsidization (or
taxation) as a means to regulate the activity of a monopoly by limiting monopoly rents
and improving consumer welfare.
Hospital Regulation
Scholars have provided a variety of reasons for government intervention in the
hospital industry (Salkever 2000). Early discussion focused on health care market
failures. In line with the public interest theory, supporters of this argument posit that
regulatory agencies act to improve economic performance of hospitals since the market
itself fails to achieve an efficient allocation of resources. Indeed, the hospital industry is
replete with market failures. First, consumers typically lack perfect information about the
prices and technical aspects of many medical devices. This lack of information places
physicians in a strong position to practice opportunistic behavior; second, most health
care providers (hospitals, clinics, physicians) face portions of downward sloping demand
curves (i.e., they have some degree of monopoly power); third, there is a lack of
incentives for both patients and providers to shop around and conserve resources.
Particularly, there is a problem of moral hazard as a result of traditional forms of health
insurance; fourth, hospitals tend to compete over quality because consumers are less
sensitive to prices. It is frequently argued that hospitals often engage in a “medical arms
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race” and compete through the provision of medically unnecessary services (Feldstein
1971; Robinson and Luft 1987; Kessler and McClellan 2000). However, some scholars
argue that correcting market failure and enhancing efficiency as objectives of regulatory
agencies are more normative than descriptive. In other words, in principle, government
should regulate the hospital industry only because public interventions maximize social
welfare. In practice, the entry of government regulations often cannot be solely explained
by the public interest theory.
With the development of more positive theories such as private interest theory and
taxation by regulation, scholars started to offer additional explanations to hospital
regulation. McDonough (1997) examined the regulation and deregulation of hospital rate
settings in four states: New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Maryland. He found
that key at-stake interest groups were able to manipulate regulation to their own
advantage. After investigating the Certificate-of-Need (CON) law in all 50 states, Teske
(2004) concluded that CON has increased hospital revenue, evidence of regulation
serving the interest of the regulated.
Paralleling the taxation by regulation or consumer subsidy rationales explained by
Posner (1971) and others, this line of argument for direct regulation of hospitals posit that
public interventions such as rate settings and CON offer some protection to hospitals that
provide charity or uncompensated care. For example, Salkever (2000) noted that as
managed care plans promote price competition in markets for hospital services, hospital
profit margins will be squeezed and the willingness of hospitals to supply charity care
will diminish. Price regulation in this case is able to pressure major payers to cover a
portion of the hospital’s uncompensated care costs.
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The next section examines the adoption, implementation and impact of specific
regulations such as Certificate-of-Need (CON) laws, Any-Willing-Provider (AWP) or
Freedom-of-Choice (FOC) regulation, rate-setting/uncompensated care pool regulation,
state hospital conversion regulation, and community benefit mandates which are the
focus of this study.
Certificate-of-Need
Certificate-of-Need (CON) laws require that hospitals obtain approval from health
planning agencies for investment related to new buildings or expansion of services in
excess of certain dollar thresholds. The original rationale of this regulatory intervention,
which is to control escalating hospital costs, is embedded in views that hospitals will
duplicate services and invest in costly excess capacity because they tend to compete on a
non-price basis (Folland, Stano et al. 2004). In the hospital industry, consumers are
believed to be largely insensitive to the price of care due to moral hazard resulting from
the proliferation of health insurance. Left unchecked, unnecessary duplication of facilities
as well as the mere availability of facilities leads to higher cost of care.
CON regulation began when New York became the first state instituting the law
in 1964. In 1972, the federal government enacted investment regulation with the passage
of Section 1122 of the Social Security Act Amendments. Section 1122 provided for the
denial of Medicare and Medicaid cost reimbursement to hospitals expanding capacity
without prior approval by local planning agencies. In 1974, the federal government
passed the National Health Planning and Resource Development Act (§P.L.93-641)
which provided federal funds for states to implement investment laws. As a consequence,
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CON soon gained in popularity among states. Most states adopted CON regulations in the
mid-1970s. By 1980 all 50 states had some form of CON or Section 1122 agreement.
In 1984, Section 1122 expired with the implementation of Medicare’s prospective
payment system. In 1986, the federal government ended its National Health Planning and
Resource Development Act that supported the development of CON programs (Santerre,
2005). Absent federal support, 14 states completely repealed CON regulation. However,
six states (Arkansas, Nebraska, Louisiana, Ohio, Oregon, and Wisconsin) retained their
CON regulation for nursing homes and long term care services, and as many as 31 states
maintained their complete CON laws.
CON laws may improve access to care for the indigent and uninsured in many
ways. Regulators may use CON to prevent entry of potential competitors who may
“cherry-pick” profitable services, hence undermining the ability of existing providers to
sustain money-losing services such as care for the indigent (Alpha-Center, 1999; Conover
& Sloan, 2003). CON may also be used to give providers incentives to build facilities in
underserved areas that have a greater demand for services such as uncompensated care
(Lewin-ICF & Center, 1991). CON is further used to protect safety net providers who
form the backbone of uncompensated care provision by increasing their financing margin
(Mendelson & Arnold, 1993). CON may explicitly require providers to supply certain
level of uncompensated care as a condition of obtaining CON approval. Lastly, some
states use CON to encourage development of nonprofit hospitals that are supposed to
provide more uncompensated care than for-profit hospitals (Alpha Center, 1999).
Few studies provide a direct link between CON and hospital uncompensated care
provision. Mendelson and Arnold (1993) found that regulators in Ohio used CON to
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protect access to care for the disadvantaged by denying applications that could have
adverse effects on the financial viability of safety net hospitals in inner cities. Lewin and
Alpha Center’s report (1991) to the Ohio Department of Health provided similar evidence.
In Pennsylvania, the CON program also tended to reward providers who agreed to supply
more uncompensated care (Alpha-Center 1999). However, an evaluation of the CON
program in Michigan yielded only minimal support for a moderate beneficial effect of
CON on serving the uninsured (Conover and Sloan 2003).
Linkages between CON and uncompensated care were most thoroughly
investigated in studies in Florida and California. Using a unique Florida data set on CON
rulings from 1983 to 1986, Fournier and Campbell (1997) examined the relationship
between CON licenses and uncompensated care provision (measured by the dollar
amount of indigent care provided by the hospital and a relative measure constructed by
dividing the dollar amount of indigent care by hospital bed size). They found that,
controlling for the endogeneity of indigent care, regulators in Florida systematically
awarded CON licenses to hospitals providing greater amount of care to the poor.
Although the validity of their instrument, hospital teaching status, is questionable, the
study offers some evidence of the impact of CON on the provision of indigent hospital
care. Similar results were reported in their earlier, more descriptive study of Florida’s
CON (Campbell and Fournier 1993).
Campbell and Ahern (1993) used two-period California data to explore the effect
of CON on uncompensated care provision. Specifically, they run separate multivariate
regressions for California hospitals in 1963 and 1987 to examine the determinants of
hospital provision of uncompensated care. They found a positive relationship between

16

net profitability of private nonprofit hospitals and the amount of uncompensated care they
provide. They argue that this finding suggests government regulators reward heavily
burdened uncompensated care providers with profitable CON licenses. Since no CON
variables are actually used in estimating the amount of uncompensated care given by
providers, this study fails to demonstrate a direct connection between CON activities and
actual provision of indigent care (Conover and Sloan 1998).
Any-Willing-Provider and Freedom-of-Choice Law
The Any-Willing-Provider (AWP) law requires that managed care organizations
accept any provider willing to abide by the plans’ terms and conditions as well as their
payment rates. The Freedom-of-Choice (FOC) law requires that a managed care enrollee
be reimbursed for health care services outside of the managed care plan networks.
The arguments for the adoption of AWP/FOC are threefold. AWP increases
access to care and, at the same time, improves quality of care. Many proponents of AWP
believe that AWP promotes health care continuity by allowing patients to maintain
relations with providers who have been their regular source of care. These laws also
resulted from the negative consumer reactions to the restrictions of managed care
although they may increase the costs of health care by relaxing these restrictions.
There are wide variations among states instituting AWP/FOC laws. Some laws
affect virtually all providers (e.g., hospitals, physicians, pharmacies) whereas others only
restrict pharmacies. As our study examines the effect of regulations on hospitals, we
include only AWP/FOC laws relating to hospitals. AWP laws applying to hospitals were
enacted as early as 1984 in Georgia. However, since the 1990s, the laws gained
popularity from concerns about potential adverse effects of managed care selective
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contracting. Thirty states had enacted either AWP or FOC, or both, for pharmacies by
1996. Thirteen states have laws relating to hospitals, and 17 have laws covering physician
services (Ohsfeldt, Morrisey et al. 1998).
Although there is no direct evidence that AWP/FOC laws influence hospital
provision of uncompensated care, some studies argue that such laws stifle competition
among hospitals, which may in turn affect their financial ability to provide
uncompensated care (Gruber 1994; Hellinger 1995). Gruber (1994) used hospital panel
data from 1984 to1988 to examine the effect of managed care selective contracting on
uncompensated care provision in California. He found that there was a large fall in net
revenue and net income in more competitive hospital markets after the advent of selective
contracting by managed care organizations. This result suggests that when competitive
pressure from selective contracting increased, uncompensated care to the uninsured
declined because hospitals are less capable of cross-subsidizing such care. Since
AWP/FOC laws restrict the extent to which managed care organizations selectively
contract with hospitals, the competitiveness of hospital markets might have decreased.
One plausible explanation is that with AWP/FOC laws, hospitals no longer enjoy
guaranteed volume of patients when all hospitals that agree to the terms set by managed
care organization are able to contract with them. As a result, hospitals do not have the
incentive to lower their cost in order to compete for managed care contracts, and hence
lower levels of competition.
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Hospital Rate Settings and Uncompensated Care Pools
These two regulations are discussed together because empirical studies of the
impact of rate setting programs on uncompensated care focus exclusively on its mandated
uncompensated pools.
Rate setting programs were widely believed to be designed to alleviate the
perceived problem of rapidly growing hospital expenditures (Cone and Dranove, 1988).
New York was the first state to enact a mandatory rate setting law in 1969 (Salkever,
2000). Rate setting soon spread to other states with some variations. However, in a
typical rate setting program, a legal authority is established for approving the rates that
hospitals charge. With Medicare’s shift to a perspective payment system in the early
1980s and the emergence of managed care and capitation as viable cost-control
mechanisms in the late 1980s, states started terminating their rate setting programs. In the
early 1980s, about 30 states employed some form of hospital rate-setting as a costcontainment device, but today none of these states except Maryland still use hospital ratesetting (McDonough 1997; Volpp, Ketcham et al. 2005).
In the early 1980s, some states started to mandate hospital uncompensated care
pools as part of their rate setting programs. Although all but one of these states eliminated
their rate setting programs, some kept the uncompensated pools requirement. New
mandates replaced the old hospital-specific add-on to rates and applied a uniform
surcharge. The resulting funds were then pooled and redistributed to hospitals according
to their amounts of uncompensated care. Hospitals with low loads of uncompensated care
were net contributors, while those with high levels were net recipients. The goals of
pooling were to improve the financial condition of hospitals with high uninsured care
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loads, more equitably fund uncompensated care, and improve access for the uninsured by
removing disincentives for hospitals, particularly private hospitals, to treat uninsured
patients (Bovbjerg, Cuellar et al. 2000). In the 1990s, Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, New York, South Carolina and Virginia all had such pools. Since Maryland
still maintains its rate setting system, hospitals are reimbursed for their uncompensated
care as part of the rate setting program (Fraser 1990).
Using data from a sample of New Jersey short-term, acute care hospitals from
1979 to 1987, Dunn and Chen (1994) employed a pre- and post-design to assess the
impacts of the introduction of uncompensated care payment on the overall level of
uncompensated care provision as well as the distribution of uncompensated care across
hospitals. Their study shows that hospitals in New Jersey did not significantly increase
their uncompensated care after the implementation of this new regulation. However, there
is evidence that this regulation has resulted in a more even distribution of uncompensated
care burden across hospitals as indicated by a positive effect on the financial condition of
hospitals providing a disproportionately larger share of this care.
Using an updated New Jersey data from 1986 to1990, Gaskin (1997) estimated
the impact of the uncompensated care pool on both inpatient and outpatient
uncompensated care. He further investigated how uncompensated care pools affect
hospitals’ collection efforts. Evidence from this study suggests that such pools have
actually induced hospitals to increase their inpatient uncompensated care by an average
of 14.8% and statewide uncompensated care by $360 million during 1987-1990. This
study did not find evidence that uncompensated care pools created a moral hazard
problem by decreasing the state’s collection efforts.

20

Spencer (1998) examined the redistributive effect of the uncompensated care pool
across hospitals in New York. Using data from 1981 to 1987, the author found that such
pools did result in routine care being redistributed away from hospitals that traditionally
provided a disproportionate share of uncompensated care to the uninsured, whereas
highly technological care was not significantly redistributed.
Earlier studies using New York hospital data all found that levels of
uncompensated care increased due to changes in regulation. Thorpe (1988) found that
during the post-regulation period from 1983 to 1985, uncompensated care increased
significantly. Similar results were found in another study by Thorpe and Phelps (1991).
However, they further argued that hospitals in New York did not increase charity care in
proportion to the amount of the grant received. Thorpe and Spencer (1991) later used a
longer panel (1981-1987) and found that pools have led to increased access for the
uninsured with public hospitals leading private hospitals in the amount of care provided.
Hospital Conversion Regulations
These state regulations impose state oversight on the process of converting public
or non-profit facilities to for-profit status through requiring attorney general approval,
advance notification, and community involvement. This state intervention was partly
motivated by the concern that conversions from public or non-profit hospitals to forprofit status might harm access to care for the low income uninsured and underinsured
population by reducing the amount of charity care provided. Stricter oversight (i.e., state
monitoring in addition to federal oversight) might protect the community’s charitable
interests. As of 1997, 24 states and District of Columbia have enacted such laws to affect
conversions from nonprofit/public hospital to for-profit status (GAO 1997).
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Little evidence exists concerning the effect of hospital conversion regulation on
conversions or uncompensated care, although a number of studies have examined the
impact of actual conversions on the provision of uncompensated care. These studies
noted either insignificant differences in the level of uncompensated care provision in
nonprofit to for-profit conversions (Young, Desai et al. 1997; Needleman, Lamphere et al.
1999; Young and Desai 1999) or significantly less uncompensated care provided to the
indigent when such conversions occur (Thorpe, Florence et al. 2000). This literature
implies that if the presence of conversion regulations successfully inhibits or stimulates
conversion activity, these regulations may have profound impact on hospital provision of
uncompensated care.
Community Benefit Mandates
Community benefit mandates require that nonprofit hospitals provide a sufficient
amount of community benefit ** to justify their tax exempt status (Noble, Hyams et al.
1998). Prior to the mid-1980s, most states used a broad community benefit approach in
defining tax exempt status for health care providers (Noble, Hyams et al. 1998; Colombo
2006). However, during the 1980s and early 1990s, motivated by the escalating concerns
that the line between nonprofit and for-profit was blurring, several states began to
question the tax exemption status for nonprofit hospitals (Potter and Longest, 1994;
Noble, Hyams, and Kane, 1998). As a result, some states adopted explicit charity care

**

Community benefit commonly include uncompensated care, health promotion services, research and
education, open access to services and community health orientation. Please see Ginn, G. O. and C. B.
Moseley (2006). "The impact of state community benefit laws on the community health orientation and
health promotion services of hospitals." J Health Polit Policy Law 31(2): 321-44..

22

tests in defining tax exempt status. In 1993, Texas became the first state to pass
legislation that requires hospitals to provide a specific percentage of hospital net patient
revenues for charity care and other community benefits. Other states have adopted a
broader community benefit test and required public reporting for a variety of community
benefits, including charity care (Noble, Hyams, and Kane 1998).
We did not find studies that explicitly examined the effect of these mandates on
hospital uncompensated care provision. Only one study indirectly investigated the effect
of state community benefit laws and guidelines on community health orientation and the
provision of hospital-based health orientation activities including uncompensated care
provision. Using a sample that included all not-for-profit and investor-owned acute-care
hospitals in the United States during the year 2000, Ginn and Moseley (2006) used
multiple regressions to test the effect of community benefit laws and type of ownership
while controlling for organizational and environmental variables. The results indicated
that, on average, nonprofit hospitals in the ten states with community benefit
laws/guidelines reported significantly more community health orientation activities than
did nonprofit hospitals in the forty other states. In addition, on average, for-profit
hospitals in the ten states with laws/guidelines reported significantly more community
health orientation activities than did comparable hospitals in the forty other states. The
study also found that community benefit laws had the effect of decreasing ownershiprelated differences in reported community health orientation activities.
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Summary of Literature Review
The literature provides some evidence that nonprofit and for-profit hospitals
might behave differently in terms of their uncompensated care provision as well as
responses to the exogenous environment. This suggests that they ought to be examined in
separate models. Furthermore, much of the research on regulation and hospital provision
of uncompensated care has focused on uncompensated care pools (and pools as part of
hospital rate setting programs). A majority of studies found that such subsidies have
successfully increased the level of uncompensated care provision in the market (Thorpe
1988; Thorpe and Spencer 1991; Gaskin 1997; Spencer 1998). Two other studies
provided additional evidence that uncompensated care pools redistributed provision of
such care among hospitals (Dunn and Chen 1994; Spencer 1998). However, one of them
fails to find that uncompensated care pool increases the level of uncompensated care
provided in New Jersey (Dunn and Chen 1994).
Although researchers have also examined the impact of CON on hospital behavior,
few studies provide a direct link between CON and hospital uncompensated care
provision. Most studies presented descriptive evidence from evaluation reports of state
CON programs (Lewin-ICF and Center 1991; Mendelson and Arnold 1993; Alpha-Center
1999; Conover and Sloan 2003). They found that CON has been used by regulators to
increase access to care for the vulnerable population. Only two studies provided some
limited empirical evidence on this question (Campbell and Ahern 1993; Campbell and
Fournier 1993; Fournier and Campbell 1997). Their studies show that in Florida and
California, hospitals that provide more uncompensated care are systematically rewarded
under CON legislation.

24

The impact of other regulatory programs on hospital provision of uncompensated
care is inadequately explored. Only one study indirectly examined the effect of a
community benefit requirement on uncompensated care provision (Ginn and Moseley
2006). Their results supported the hypothesis that nonprofit hospitals offer significantly
more community health-oriented services (which include uncompensated care) in the
presence of community benefit mandates.
The review of the literature on regulatory environment and hospital supply of
uncompensated care also revealed some shortcomings. First, most previous studies have
examined hospitals’ uncompensated care provision and regulatory environment by
focusing on a single regulation such as hospital uncompensated pool or certificate-ofneed (CON) regulation. Recent studies have indicated that regulatory programs should
be analyzed in the context of the larger regulatory environment (Sloan, Morrisey et al.
1988; Antel, Ohsfeldt et al. 1995). The interplay of incentives offered by different
regulatory programs may have resulted in unexpected consequences that cannot be
predicted by analyzing a single regulation. In addition, due to interactions among
different regulations, the combined effects of a regulation bundle may be different from a
regulation acting alone. Evidence from other industry studies further suggest that
regulations, particularly of different parts of an industry, should be viewed as a system
because, for instance, when regulation controls price, firms will find other ways to
compete (i.e., engaging in non-price competition) (Viscusi, Harrington et al. 2005).
Second, early works have predominately used data from a single state (e.g., New
Jersey, New York, California or Florida). Although some CON studies have used a
dichotomous variable to compare regulatory effects in markets with and without
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regulation using data from all 50 states, none has investigated the effect of CON on
uncompensated care provision using national data. The shortcoming of employing data
from a single state is the inability to compare differences in regulations among the states.
Further, even if studies have used national data, the comparison states are not completely
free of similar regulations if they fail to take into account a broader scope of regulations.
Regulations other than the one under investigation might have confounded the results if
researchers are not cautious about their comparison groups.
Finally, existing studies need to be updated. An overwhelming number of studies
used data in the 1980s and early 1990s, a period which is no longer of current policy
interest. There have been dramatic changes in the health care marketplace during the late
1990s and early 2000s (e.g., increased competition and cost control and reduced support
for care of the uninsured). These major changes in the health care market may be altering
the effectiveness of existing programs. Results obtained from recent data will prove to be
more relevant to formulate policies for the current health care system.
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CHAPTER THREE
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, TYPOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES

Theoretical Framework
As suggested by previous literature, hospitals of different ownership types differ
in term of their uncompensated care provision and their different responses might be
influenced by the regulatory environment. Theoretical models of hospital uncompensated
care supply are useful in examining hospital response to and the impact of different
policy options since these frameworks help illuminate determinants of hospital
uncompensated care provision. We draw on the work of Frank and Salkever (1991),
Gruber (1994), and Banks, Paterson and Wendel (1997) and simplify their models to
investigate equilibrium hospital behavior when the regulatory environment changes.
In these models, nonprofit hospitals are assumed to be concerned about the health
of the entire community, including the economically disadvantaged. Their supply of
uncompensated care is believed to be socially motivated, subject to financial resource
constraints. In contrast, for-profit hospitals are hypothesized to supply uncompensated
care to the extent that doing so maximizes profits because they are concerned that they
might incur costs if the community perceives that they under-produce uncompensated
care. For-profit hospitals’ supply of uncompensated care therefore is a business strategy
that may enhance a hospital’s reputation and reduce the expected penalty of underproducing such care.
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Frank and Salkever (1991) focus on the supply of charity services by nonprofit
hospitals. They argue that price-taking private nonprofit hospitals seek to maximize
utility (U) which is a function †† of net revenue R and unmet indigent care need N.
U = U (R, N)

or

U = U [(QP +rD +E – C(Q +D)), (T-D-H-G)]
where
QP = the average revenue for compensated care;
Q = the number of paying patients
r = revenue per indigent patient;
D = the number of indigent patients;
E = sum of endowment income;
C = hospital’s cost function
T = total indigent care need;
H = other private hospitals
G = public hospitals
In this model, nonprofit hospitals earn net revenue to subsidize uncompensated
care. It also predicts that increases in the supply of charity care by other hospitals in the
market crowds out indigent care in the nonprofit hospital. A slight variation, the “impure

††

It should be noted that the argument R in the nonprofit utility function may be viewed as a proxy
representing “profits” spent to pursue all objectives perceived by the hospital’s managers or trustees other
than uncompensated care provision. For example, Newhouse proposed a utility function with quality and
quantity as arguments subject to a breakeven constraint (please refer to Newhouse, J. (1970). "Toward a
theory of nonprofit institutions: an economic model of a hospital." American Economic Review 60(1): 6474.) The model offered by Pauly suggests that hospitals seek to maximize income of physicians or decision
makers. The specification of the arguments does not however alter the results (see Pauly, M. V. (1987).
"Nonprofit firms in medical markets." American Economic Review 77(2): 257-262.)
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altruism” model (Frank and Salkever 1991), was proposed to account for nonprofit
hospital’s rivalry motivation, which leads to a potential smaller crowd-out effect by other
hospitals in the market. In this model, a third argument (Z) indicating the hospital’s
performance in supplying charity care relative to its rivals was added to the utility
function so that nonprofit hospitals are assumed to compete with other private hospitals
by providing uncompensated care.
Gruber (1994) simplified the above model as nonprofit hospitals maximizing a
utility function V [R, U], subject to R= pq – c(q) – U
where
R = net revenue,
U= uncompensated care,
p = price per unit of service,
q = quantity of services,
c(q) = hospital cost function; cq > 0, cqq> 0.
In contrast to Frank and Salkever’s framework which takes price as exogenous,
this model assumes a monopolistic hospital market, or in other words, prices charged to
private paying patients are endogenous. This assumption was supported by literature
arguing that the medical market place can be best described as monopolistically
competitive, due to the presence of imperfect, costly price and quality information
(Dranove, Satterthwaite et al. 1986; Dranove and Satterthwaite 1992). However, the
difference in assumptions does not change the predictions drawn from these models.
The model developed by Banks, Paterson and Wendel (1997) was motivated by
Gray (1991) to explain uncompensated care provision by for-profit hospitals. This model
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assumes that for-profit hospitals provide charity care because they are concerned that
they might incur costs if the community perceives that they under-produce
uncompensated care. These costs might take the form of penalties such as failure to be
granted a CON or loss of state Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments. Forprofit hospitals are hence assumed to maximize the profit function‡‡ (Π) with:

Π = QP (Q;d) – C(Q, U) – F – L(e – U)
where
U = uncompensated care;
QP (Q;d) = the average revenue for compensated care;
Q = the patient days of compensated care;
d = demand curve shift parameter;
C (Q, U) = variable cost of producing Q and U;
F = fixed cost
L(e – U) = expected penalty cost.
Based on previous research and given different motivations between nonprofit
and for-profit hospitals, a nonprofit hospital’s utility function (V) can be mathematically
expressed as:
Nonprofit: V≡ max [R, U] ；subject to §§ R = QP (Q;d)+rU – C(Q, U)

‡‡

For derivations of the for-profit model, please refer to Banks, et al. (1997). "Uncompensated hospital
care: charitable mission or profitable business decision?" Health Econ 6(2): 133-43..
§§
Nonprofit organizations face a non-distribution constraint, which means they cannot legally distribute
any of their residual earnings to stakeholders. Santerre, R. E. and J. A. Vernon (2006). "The consumer
welfare implications of the hospital ownership mix in the US: an exploratory study." Ibid. 15(11): 1187-99.
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To simplify the derivations, we follow Banks et al (1997) and assume a special
case where hospitals earn net revenue to subsidize uncompensated care. In other words,
we assume that nonprofit hospitals maximize uncompensated care:
V’≡ max [U]; subject to F = QP (Q;d)+rU – C(Q, U)=0
whereas a for-profit hospital’s objective is to maximize profit (Π):
For-profit: Π ≡max [QP (Q;d) +rU] – C(Q, U) – L(e – U)
where
R = net revenue
U = uncompensated care;
QP (Q;d) = the average revenue for compensated care;
Q = the patient days of compensated care;
d = demand curve shift parameter such as competition;
r = revenue per indigent care patient ***
C (Q, U) = variable cost of producing Q and U;
L(e – U) = expected penalty cost.
These theoretical models assume that hospitals are price setters and they exercise
control over the amount of uncompensated care supplied. In addition, the medically
indigent demand for uncompensated care is assumed to exceed hospital desired supply.
For nonprofit hospitals, solving for their constraint:
F = QP (Q;d)+rU – C(Q, U)=0

***

r theoretically is zero for indigent care as this care is uncompensated. However, with various subsidies
this care can be compensated at a rate that equals to r (0 ≤ r ≤ p).
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QP (Q;d)+rU = C(Q, U)
This equation implies that nonprofit hospitals supply uncompensated care to the
point when marginal revenue equals marginal cost (i.e., MR = MC) †††.
For for-profit hospitals: the first order conditions (FOC) are
πQ = QPQ + P - CQ = 0
πU = r - CU + L′= 0
These FOCs imply that for-profit hospitals supply uncompensated care to the
point when marginal benefit equals marginal cost (i.e., MB = MC).
Solving for the constraint and the FOCs, we obtain the following comparative
statics for nonprofit and for-profit hospitals respectively (Table 1 ‡‡‡).

†††

Given that net revenue is modeled as a proxy for “activities” that produce utilities/benefits, the marginal
revenue really is another way of labeling marginal utility/benefits.

‡‡‡

D is the determinant of matrix

∂π Q

∂π Q

∂Q
∂π U
∂Q

∂U .
∂π U
∂U

.
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Table 1: Comparative Static Results for Nonprofit and For-profit Model
Nonprofit

For-profit

Ud = PdQ/CU

<0

Ud = [-CQUPQd]/D

>0

Ur = -U/-CU

>0

Ur = -[2PQ + QPQQ – CQQ]/D

>0

Ue = [(QPQQ + 2PQ – CQQ)(-L″)]/D

>0

These results delineate the differences between nonprofit and for-profit hospital
supply of uncompensated care. Nonprofit hospitals provide uncompensated care because
supplying such care increases their utility. They produce uncompensated care to the point
where the marginal revenue is balanced by the marginal cost of uncompensated care
provision. However, for-profit hospitals provide uncompensated care because they are
concerned that they might incur costs if the community perceives that they under-produce
uncompensated care. Unlike their nonprofit counterparts, for-profit hospitals treat
uncompensated care provision as a profit maximizing strategy. Producing such care does
not add utility to for-profit hospitals but it maximizes their profits by lowering their
penalty costs. The optimum level of uncompensated care supplied by for-profit hospitals
is achieved by equating marginal cost with the hospital’s marginal benefit of producing
such care.
These differences indicate that nonprofit hospitals and for-profit hospitals would
respond to different incentives and environmental changes differently. Nonprofit
hospitals respond to a downward shift in demand by reducing the amount of
uncompensated care provision because decreased demand for paid care implies decreased
profits available for financing uncompensated care. An increase in the marginal revenue
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that results from an increased number of paying patients will increase supply of
uncompensated care. Similarly, an increase in the revenue per indigent patient (usually in
the form of subsidies) increases uncompensated care. Nonprofit hospitals will also
respond to increased competition by reducing their charity care output. This is because
when competition intensifies, the price for paying patients goes down. As a result,
nonprofit hospitals have less revenue from the paying patients to cross-subsidize
uncompensated care. They therefore have to decrease the amount of uncompensated care
in order to survive the fierce competition. On the contrary, for-profit hospitals may
increase the supply of uncompensated care when market demand for compensated care
decreases since the concurrent decrease in paid care reduces the marginal cost of
producing uncompensated care. They would respond to competition by increasing their
uncompensated care supply. One explanation is that the price for paying patients
decreases as competition increases. Consequently, the decrease in the price of paid care
lowers the marginal cost of providing uncompensated care. For-profit hospitals therefore
supply more uncompensated care as the marginal cost of providing such care decreases.
On the other hand, the for-profit model also predicts that for-profit hospitals will respond
to the level of community expectation or will incur penalties resulting from failure to
meet community expectation.
Typology
Before we generate any predictions regarding the impact of regulatory
environment on hospital’s provision of uncompensated care, it is crucial that we develop
a typology so that regulations can be grouped and examined in meaningful ways. The
comparative static analysis represents a convenient tool for this categorization. The
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analysis illuminates different mechanisms through which regulations exert an impact on
hospital behavior. We hence categorize different regulatory environment on this basis.
Since both CON and AWP/FOC affect hospital supply of uncompensated care by either
increasing or decreasing competition d, we label these regulations as competition
regulations. Uncompensated care pools and pools as part of the rate setting programs
increase revenue per indigent care patient r, and we classify this type of regulation as
subsidies. Because states use requirements such as conversion oversight and community
benefit requirements to explicitly communicate expectations for community services such
as uncompensated care, we categorize these regulations as mandates. This taxonomy
provides us a framework to organize seemingly complicated regulatory environments so
as to improve our understanding of the different mechanisms through which regulations
can affect hospital behavior. The next section uses CON, uncompensated care pool, and
community benefit requirement regulations as examples to illustrate how hypotheses can
be developed for each type and/or individual regulation.
Hypotheses
Previous research shows that CON, as an entry barrier, has reduced competition
by maintaining high levels of industry concentration and restricting supply of services.
After analyzing the impact of CON on entry of new firms into the dialysis industry, Ford
and Kaserman (1993) found that the presence of CON laws significantly reduced the
entry and expansion of dialysis firms. Gruber (1994) studied the effect of competitive
pressure on hospital provision of uncompensated care. He found that nonprofit hospitals
provide more uncompensated care in more concentrated markets. These findings, in
conjunction with predicted effect of competition on hospital provision of uncompensated
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care discussed in the previous section, led us to conclude that nonprofit hospitals may
increase their uncompensated care supply in response to CON laws.
For-profit hospitals may respond to CON by either decreasing or increasing their
uncompensated care supply. This is because on the one hand, CON has constrained
market competition and promoted profits generated by private paying patients. When
paid care becomes more profitable, the opportunity cost of providing uncompensated care
(i.e., cost of forgoing paid care) rises. For-profit hospitals therefore would reduce their
uncompensated care supply when CON increases industry concentration. On the other
hand, for-profit hospitals may also perceive the failure to obtain CON as a profit loss, and
hence increase their uncompensated care provision in states with such a regulation. The
resulting direction of CON’s impact on for-profit hospitals remains undetermined.

H1: ceteris paribus, nonprofit hospitals in states with CON laws will provide
more uncompensated care than their counterparts in states without such a regulation.
H2: ceteris paribus, for-profit hospitals in states with CON laws will provide less
or more uncompensated care than their counterparts in states without such a regulation.

With increasing direct subsidies such as reimbursement from uncompensated care
pools, both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals should increase their uncompensated care
supply. Intuitively, this happens because reimbursing hospitals based on their
uncompensated care cost increases the revenue per indigent patient. Therefore, we expect
to see hospitals increase their uncompensated care supply when provided such a subsidy.
Profit maximizing for-profit hospitals might also perceive the loss of pool subsidies as

36

penalties resulting from failure to meet the health care needs of the community. In this
case, they will increase their supply of uncompensated care when such subsidies raise
their expected penalty cost. Therefore, the direction of the signs on nonprofit and forprofit hospital uncompensated care provision is expected to be the same.

H3: ceteris paribus, both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals in states with
uncompensated care pool regulation or subsidy regulation will provide more
uncompensated care than their counterparts in states without such regulations.

The responses of nonprofit and for-profit hospitals under community benefit
requirement regulations are rather ambiguous. Given the mandate for nonprofit hospitals,
we expect that they comply with the regulations by increasing their uncompensated care
supply (if they had not provided the desired level). However, if community benefit
requirement regulations help to improve the overall health of the community, given that
hospitals in states with such laws typically provide better access to primary/preventive
care (Ginn and Moseley 2006), we might see a decrease in uncompensated inpatient care
as a result of a decline in the demand for inpatient care. We might also see such a
negative relationship between community benefit requirement laws and nonprofit
hospitals’ provision of uncompensated care if the community benefit requirement is set
below the level at which hospitals actually provide uncompensated care. These laws
could provide a signal to reduce nonprofit hospitals’ provision of care by suggesting that
their prior levels of such care are above the levels expected by the community.
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Although these mandates are not intended to be binding for the for-profit hospitals,
they send a signal to health care providers of what is expected by the community. Since
for-profit hospitals perceive that they could incur costs if they fail to meet community
expectation, we might expect to see a significant increase in the level of uncompensated
care provided by for-profit hospitals.
However, there might be a “crowd-out” effect as a result of these mandates as
Frank and Salkever (1991) predict. If for-profit hospitals increase their uncompensated
care supply, nonprofits serving the same market will tend to reduce their provision of
uncompensated care. A number of empirical studies supported this argument (Horwitz
2005; Schlesinger and Gray 2006). The extended “impure altruism” model adds to this
prediction by arguing that this effect is likely to be moderate or weak if we further
assume that a nonprofit hospital maximizes performance in supplying charity care
relative to its rivals. If an increase in for-profit hospital’s uncompensated care provision
results in a decrease of supply from its rivalry nonprofit hospital, the mandates could lead
to a different distribution of uncompensated care supply in the market.
Another piece of evidence complicates this prediction even further. Some studies
have shown that in mixed ownership markets, for-profit hospitals provide significantly
less charity care when nonprofit hospitals provide high level of uncompensated care
(Clement, White et al. 2002). This phenomenon represents a reversed crowd-out effect:
for-profit crowd-out by nonprofit hospitals. This means if nonprofit hospitals respond to
mandates by increasing their supply of care, for-profit hospitals will decrease their supply.
After all, these mandates are not legally intended for for-profit hospitals and might not be
binding for them. The final direction of the signs therefore remains an empirical matter.
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H4: ceteris paribus, both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals in states with
community benefit requirement laws will provide more/less uncompensated care than
their counterparts in states without such regulations.

In addition to behavioral differences between hospitals, we are also interested in
regulatory interactions. A few studies suggest that regulations working together may in
some cases enhance the effectiveness of one another. For example, Antel et al. (1995)
examined the effects of various regulation (e.g., rate setting, CON, Medicare perspective
payment and Nixon-era Economic Stabilization Program) on hospital costs. Using a twodecade-long panel dataset of the 48 continental states, they found that although few
regulations under investigation have had a significant effect on controlling hospital costs,
rate regulation, interacting with Medicare perspective payment, has successfully limited
the cost increase. We therefore predict that there might be interaction effects in the sense
that an individual regulation will be more/less effective in the presence of other
regulations.
CON, interacting with uncompensated care pools may complement each other and
increase the uncompensated care provision by nonprofit hospitals. This is expected
because both CON and pool are predicted to be positively related to nonprofit hospital
supply of uncompensated care. CON improves nonprofit hospital’s ability to crosssubsidize care for the uninsured. When given extra incentive by public subsidies such as
uncompensated care pools, nonprofit hospitals will provide more uncompensated care
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comparing with comparable hospitals in states that do not have both regulations. For forprofit hospitals, the sign on the interaction term between CON and uncompensated care
pool is undetermined. CON is expected to decrease uncompensated care provision by forprofit hospitals since the cost of providing unpaid care increases when CON stifles
competition. However, uncompensated care pool gives for-profit hospitals incentive to
increase their uncompensated care provision. Which impact dominates when states
implement both regulations remains an empirical issue.
The evaluation of interaction effects between CON and community benefit
requirement laws is another empirical issue because the impact of community benefit
requirement laws can be either positive or negative for both types of hospitals. The sign
on the interaction between community benefit requirement and uncompensated care pool
as well as the interaction of all three regulations remain uncertain for similar reasons.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL SPECIFICATION

Empirical Specification
Our model specification follows the theoretical framework described in the
previous section. A hospital’s provision of uncompensated care is influenced by the
regulatory environment, institutional/market factors that affect the hospital’s capacity to
supply uncompensated care, and demand for uncompensated care.
We treat nonfederal, short-term hospitals as our study unit to examine different
organizational responses to the regulatory environment and possible policy interactions.
A general specification of our empirical model is:

UCit = β0 + β1Hospitalit + β2Marketit + β3Regulationit+β4Year+ β5State+ ε it
where i = 1 to N, t = 1 to T; UCit is our measure for hospital i uncompensated care
provision by services in year t; Hospital is a vector of hospital organizational
characteristics to measure a hospital’s capacity to provide uncompensated care; Market is
a vector of market variables that can affect the supply of, or demand for, uncompensated
care in a market; Regulation, our key focus, is a vector of regulatory variables that
measures states’ different regulatory environments; Year represents year dummies; State
represents a vector of states dummies, capturing state specific trends; ε it is a composite
error term that can be expressed as ε it = α i + η it , where α i is a hospital specific error
component term; and η it represents the idiosyncratic error term.
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Data
We rely on three primary data sources for the period 2002 – 2004 for the current
research. (1) The American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey of Hospitals
(2002, 2003, and 2004) collects data from all U.S. hospitals and includes a variety of
organizational and operational characteristics such as availability of services, utilization,
personnel, finances and governance; (2) The Area Resource File (ARF) (2005) contains
information on market characteristics as well as community demographics that may
affect demand for uncompensated care. Compiled by the Health Resources and Services
Administration (HRSA), ARF is a national county-level collection of datasets from more
than 50 sources including the Current Population Survey (CPS), InterStudy, and the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. It includes information on healthcare professionals, health
professions training, health facilities, hospital utilization, hospital expenditures, county
population and economics, as well as county-level socioeconomic and geographic codes
that allow us to merge these data with other files; (3) The State Inpatient Database (SID)
from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) (2002, 2003, and 2004)
contains detailed information on over 90 percent of inpatient discharges from all
community hospitals in 20 states. Since hospital discharge data include zip code
information on patient residence, we are able to define markets using patient flows and
test if differences in market definition will affect study results.
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Construction of the Sample
We used HCUP SID data for seventeen states (AZ, CO, FL, IA, KY, MA, MD,
NV, NJ, NY, OR, RI, UT, WA, WV, WI and NC) for information on the total number of
admissions and payer types to obtain the percentage of admissions for the uninsured.
These states are selected based on their geographical representativeness and diverse
regulatory environments.
Geographically, our study states are distributed across the five U.S. regions (as
shown by Figure 1): West (WA, OR, NV, UT, CO), Southwest (AZ), Midwest (IA, WI),
Southeast (FL, NC, KY, WV), and Northeast (MD, NY, NJ, RI, MA) with Southwest and
Midwest slightly under-represented.
When examining individual regulations, we observe some variation except in
AWP/FOC laws. Table 2 shows that among all 17 states, five are non-CON states (AZ,
CO, OR, UT and WI). Five states have community benefit requirement regulations (MA,
MD, NY, RI and UT) §§§, and eight states fund an uncompensated care pool (AZ, CO,
MA, MD, NJ, NV, NY and WV). Additional evidence for variations in policy
interactions can be found in Appendix A.

§§§

NC and NV enacted community benefit requirement laws in 2005.
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Figure 1: Study States vs. Non-study States
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Table 2: Variations of Regulations by Study States

States

POOL

CONVERSION

Arizona

X

X

Colorado

X

X

X

Florida

CON

AWP/FOC

X

Iowa

X

Kentucky

X

Maryland

X

X

X

Massachusetts

X

X

X

Nevada

X

X

X

New Jersey

X

New York

X

X

X

North Carolina

X

X

Oregon†

X

Rhode Island

X

Utah

†

REQUIREMENT

X

X

X
X

X

X

Washington

X

West Virginia

X

Wisconsin†

X

Total

12

X
X
X
7

8

Long-term care facility only
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6

2

The HCUP SID data assign a unique data source hospital identifier which can be
matched with the AHA identifier provided by a link file in the HCUP SID data. The
AHA identifier then serves as the distinguishing identifier in the linked dataset, which
uses the AHA data for information on hospital characteristics such as hospital size and
ownership status. Data from the Area Resource Files on market and community
characteristics are merged using county codes.
The sample for this study consists of hospital-level data for nonfederal, short-term,
general hospitals in the 17 states. All specialty, psychiatric, and long-term care hospitals
are excluded. The original dataset for analysis comprised 4,324 hospital-years for the
study period 2002-2004. This excludes 2004 data for Utah and New York as these states
did not report to the HCUP for those years. After hospitals with only one year of
observations are excluded, we are left with a study sample of 2,625 nonprofit and 500
for-profit hospital-year observations. In the nonprofit sample, about 78 percent (779
hospitals) have all three years of observations and the remaining 22 percent (204
hospitals) have two years of observations. In the for-profit sample, about 84 percent (148
hospitals) have three years of observations and the remaining 16 percent (28 hospitals)
have two years of observations. In addition, we have missing values on two important
control variables, the technology intensity variable and the ER variable measuring
whether a hospital has an emergency department. We imputed values for the technology
intensity variable for 2002, the year we have missing values. Our final sample therefore
contains 2,322 nonprofit and 295 for-profit observations. In our final sample, 76 percent
(613 nonprofit hospitals) and 24 percent (198 nonprofit hospitals) have three and two
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years of observations respectively. 48 percent (57 for-profit hospitals) and 52 percent (62
for-profit hospitals) have three and two years of observations respectively.
We carefully examined whether there might be sample selection bias due to our
choice of the states as well as to the pattern of the missing values. Since it is reasonable
to assume that a state’s decision to participate in HCUP reporting during certain time
periods is independent of hospital supply of uncompensated care, we are confident that
states are excluded randomly.
We also lost a significant number of observations due to missing values on the
technology intensity and ER variable. Table 3.1 shows that none of the hospitals in our
study states reported on the technology intensity variable in 2002. The remaining
states/years have missing values that range from 1% to 42%. In 2003 and 2004, those
hospitals that did not respond to the technology intensity variable did not respond to the
ER variable, either. Most hospitals reported on the ER variable in 2002 (Table 3.2). In
order to utilize the 2002 data, we imputed values for the 2002 technology intensity
variable. We replaced missing values on this variable in 2002 by values the same
hospitals reported in 2003, assuming that the number of hi-tech services did not change
from 2002 to 2003 for these hospitals. Sensitivity analyses are conducted to examine
whenever our results are significantly affected by excluding/including these two variables.
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Table 3.1: Percent of Missing Values for Technology Intensity by State/Year
State
Arizona
Colorado
Florida
Iowa
Kentucky
Maryland
Massachusetts
Nevada
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Oregon
Rhode Island
Utah
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin

2002
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

2003
26%
22%
27%
0
5%
0
0
27%
13%
24%
15%
0
20%
13%
15%
0
2%

2004
24%
13%
29%
0
19%
4%
1%
42%
13%
N/A
14%
0
20%
N/A
22%
0
7%

Table 3.2: Percent of Missing Values for ER by State/Year
State
Arizona
Colorado
Florida
Iowa
Kentucky
Maryland
Massachusetts
Nevada
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Oregon
Rhode Island
Utah
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin

2002
22%
21%
33%
0
13%
9%
1%
23%
6%
25%
17%
3%
10%
18%
12%
0
7%
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2003
26%
22%
27%
0
5%
0
0
27%
13%
24%
15%
0
20%
13%
15%
0
2%

2004
24%
13%
29%
0
19%
4%
1%
42%
13%
N/A
14%
0
20%
N/A
22%
0
7%

Dependent Variable
Uncompensated care is widely used to capture hospital provision of care to the
uninsured. In many prior studies, it is measured as charity care and bad debt. Charity care
includes care provided to the indigent who are not expected to pay, whereas bad debt is
accrued by someone who is expected to pay but does not pay at all or fails to pay the full
amount of their medical bills. There are three problems with this definition. Some
scholars argue that including bad debt as part of the measure would overstate a hospital’s
uncompensated care provision. This is because the amount of bad debt also reflects a
hospital’s debt collection efforts (Gaskin 1997; Thorpe, Florence et al. 2000; Rosko
2004). For example, Gaskin (1997) argues that the implementation of an uncompensated
care pool in Massachusetts could potentially create a moral hazard problem in that the
pool reduced the marginal cost of debt collection. As a result, without proper monitoring
of the hospitals’ debt collection efforts, their bad debt portion of the uncompensated care
could increase in response to the Trust Fund. A second disadvantage of lumping charity
care and bad debt under the same uncompensated care umbrella is that the distinction
between charity care and bad debt is unclear. Some hospitals use a formal process in
advance of billing to identify those who are unable to pay, while others use the billing
and collection process. Consequently, care delivered to patients may be classified as
charity care by one hospital but bad debt by another (AHA 2005). Lastly, using
uncompensated care data for comparisons among different types of hospitals or hospitals
with mixed payer types can be problematic because uncompensated care data, generally
expressed as charges, are usually sensitive to different hospital accounting practices
(AHA 2005). Despite these concerns, studies continue to use both charity care and bad
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debt to measure hospital provision of uncompensated care due to the fact that existing
data sets do not make meaningful distinctions between the two concepts (Rundall, Sofaer
et al. 1988).
We improve upon measures of uncompensated care used in previous studies by
focusing on the actual hospital services delivered to the uninsured. In our analysis,
uncompensated care is measured as number/percent of admissions per hospital that are
for the uninsured. This dependent variable is constructed as (1) number of all admissions
for self-pay/charity patients in a hospital; (2) percent of admissions for self-pay/charity
patients by dividing the number of admissions for self-pay and charity patients in a
hospital by all the admissions in that hospital. Although this measure could slightly
overstate the amount of hospital care that is indeed uncompensated since some of these
uninsured patients may pay in-part or in-full and some may qualify for coverage after
they have been admitted, this still represents an improvement over previous measures for
the following reasons. Our measure directly captures care provided to the uninsured.
Therefore, it represents a better indicator of access to care for the uninsured than financial
measures of uncompensated care. In addition, it is not influenced by individual hospital
accounting practices. As argued by Gruber (1994), changes in uncompensated care
measured as charges may not be directly interpretable as changes in the level of care
delivered to the uninsured because these changes in charges are likely to reflect shifts in
hospital pricing policy and debt collection efforts.
One earlier study that used the same measure to capture hospitals services to the
uninsured, Frank and Salkever (1991), developed a theoretical model of indigent care
supply by nonprofit hospitals. They tested the model using 40 nonprofit general hospitals
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in Maryland during the period of 1980-1984. Three regression analyses were conducted
with three different dependent variables: the number of equivalent admissions accounted
for by uncompensated care in the hospital (calculated by dividing the dollar amount of
uncompensated care by the hospital’s gross inpatient revenue per admission), the same
measure adjusted by case-mix costliness, and number of discharges of inpatients
classified at admission as either self-pay or charity cases. Their study found few
differences across the three measures, which provides validation for our alternative
measure of uncompensated care.
Regulatory Variables
The literature on regulations suggests that variations in regulatory intensity affect
the financial resources of hospitals and hence have direct and indirect effects on hospital
responses to their regulatory environment (Cook, Shortell et al. 1983). Cook, Shortell et
al. (1983) also argue that dimensions of regulations, such as scope, restrictiveness,
uncertainty, and duration, need to be considered when examining regulatory impacts. We
therefore include these specific dimensions proposed by Cook et al. in our regulatory
measures to capture the intensity of the regulations.
Researchers argue that the structure and scope of CON regulations have led to
variations in the effectiveness of this program (Salkever 2000). Variables such as dollar
thresholds and scope of services are indicative of intensity variations of CON programs
with lower dollar thresholds and broader scope of control predictive of stricter regulatory
control. We therefore adopt the index developed by the American Health Planning
Association (2005) to measure the presence and intensity of CON programs. This index is
constructed as a weighted number of covered services, with the weights capturing the
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review thresholds **** of different CON programs. Specifically, state CON programs are
first weighted by their capital, equipment and new service review dollar thresholds.
Assigning a weight to each state’s CON programs represents a way to reflect the
restrictiveness of the program. These weights are then multiplied by the number of
services, which captures the scope of the program, to obtain the intensity index. States
with a higher index have more restrictive CON control, while states without CON
programs are assigned a score of zero. Although this index has been adopted by many
earlier studies, it has some limitations. This index does not reflect the duration of the
program, which is argued to affect the intensity of the programs. However, this will not
affect our estimates because all the study states adopted their CON regulation in the late
1960s or early 1970s. Another problem with this index, as is true with all indices, is the
assumption that each unit on the intensity scale exerts the same impact on the dependent
variable, which tends to limit our interpretation of marginal effects. However, our ability
to determine the direction of the impacts is not compromised by this problem.
POOL is an interval level variable measuring variations of the restrictiveness of
state uncompensated care pool regulations. States without a pool regulation are assigned
a value of zero, states with a voluntary pool regulation, such as West Virginia and
Nevada, are accorded a value of one, and states with mandatory pools are assigned a
value of two.

****

Review threshold refers to the threshold for expenditure of the new service/capital/equipment that
exceeds certain dollar amount. Hospital expenditures have to be reviewed if they exceed a certain
threshold.
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REQUIREMENT represents an index that takes values of zero, one, two and three.
It captures the duration, restrictiveness and scope of community benefit requirement laws.
Duration is measured by the length of time community benefit requirement laws have
been in effect. Consistent with Ginn and Moseley (2006) and given our study period, we
argue that laws that are proposed and implemented before year 2000 are more mature,
have a longer duration and stronger impact than laws that were instituted after year 2000.
We measure restrictiveness by whether community benefit requirement laws are
mandatory or voluntary. Some states such as Massachusetts have laws that are largely
voluntary, making them less restrictive than those that are mandatory. Lastly, we posit
that laws that are broader in scope, such as those mandating both public reporting of
community benefits and a specific percentage of hospital net patient revenues be devoted
to charity care, are more intense than laws that require either public reporting or a
proportionate amount of contribution. The index is developed by summing the numbers
across three dimensions (see Table 4). States without community benefit requirement
laws are assigned a value of zero. By construction, a state with a voluntary community
benefit requirement law implemented prior to 2000 and with either public reporting or a
percent requirement would also assume a value of zero, which makes it indistinguishable
from states without such a regulation. This, however, is not a concern for the current
study because none of our study states fits the above profile.
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Table 4: Intensity Index: Dimensions for Community Benefit Requirement
Laws
Dimensions

Duration

Before 2000

0

After 2000

1

Restrictiveness

Voluntary

0

Mandatory

1

Public Reporting OR
Percentage Requirement

Scope

0

Public Reporting AND
Percentage Requirement

1

We also create interactions of regulatory variables to test if there are any
interaction effects among different regulatory programs. We test nonprofit and for-profit
hospitals in separate models, as suggested by previous literatures as well as the
theoretical framework. We exclude AWP/FOC and state conversion laws from our final
analysis due to a lack of variation on both regulations. Only two states (KY and WI) have
AWP/FOC laws. Although six states have conversion regulations, limited information on
regulatory intensity prohibits us from separating the effects of locating in a given state (or
states effects) from the effects of state conversion regulations.
Control Variables
We control for a series of hospital characteristics that could affect its capacity to
provide uncompensated care. To be consistent with other studies of hospital
uncompensated care provision, we controlled for teaching status, the number of hightechnology services offered by the hospital, hospital size, public hospital, whether a
hospital has an emergency department, and hospital system/network membership. These
variables are all extracted from the AHA (2002, 2003, and 2004) data.
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We include hospital teaching status coded one as teaching and zero otherwise to
capture uncompensated care provision by teaching hospitals. We define a teaching
hospital as one approved to participate in residency training by the Accreditation Council
for Graduate Medical Education, affiliated with a medical school, or a member of the
Council of Teaching Hospitals (COTH). Studies have shown that teaching hospitals bear
a disproportionate share of the uncompensated care burden. In their five-state analysis of
uncompensated care distribution among U.S. hospitals, the General Accounting Office
(GAO) found that major teaching hospitals accounted for a large percentage of the total
uncompensated care cost compared with other nonprofit or for-profit hospitals (GAO
2006). We hence expect that hospital teaching status is positively associated with
uncompensated care provision.
Following previous studies, we also control for hospital characteristics that would
affect the shape of the cost curve. Such measures include technology intensity, hospital
size, and whether the hospital has an emergency department. Since larger and more
technology-intense hospitals have more capacity to provide uncompensated care, we
expect that hospital size (as measured by number of beds), technology intensity (as
measured by the number of high-technology services offered by the hospital in the
following areas: neonatal intensive care, open heart surgery, cardiac catheterization, CT
and Positron Emission Tomography or PET ††††), are positively related to uncompensated

††††

As suggested by previous studies, Dranove, D. and M. Shanley (1995). "Cost Reductions or Reputation
Enhancement as Motives for Mergers: the Logic of Multihosipital Systems." Strategic Management Journal
16(1): 55-74, Davidoff, A. J., A. T. LoSasso, et al. (2000). "The effect of changing state health policy on
hospital uncompensated care." Inquiry 37(3): 253-67, Bazzoli, G. J., R. C. Lindrooth, et al. (2006). "The
influence of health policy and market factors on the hospital safety net." Health Serv Res 41(4 Pt 1): 1159-
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care provision. Whether a hospital has an emergency department is a dummy variable
measure indicating the presence of an ER. Since hospitals with an ER are more likely to
encounter uninsured patients (given that the uninsured often wait to seek care until
symptoms worsen), we expect that having an emergency department is also positively
associated with uncompensated care provision.
Research suggests that multiunit system affiliations promote hospital provision of
community benefits including uncompensated care (Proenca, Rosko et al. 2000; Lee,
Alexander et al. 2003). This is because, on the one hand, hospitals belonging to a
system/network have more resources or excess capacity to deal with exogenous pressures,
such as financial stress from various cost containment efforts, without compromising
their community orientation (Cook, Shortell et al. 1983). On the other hand, institutional
theory indicates that larger organizations attract more attention and therefore may be
under more pressure to conform to community expectations (Rosko 2004). We therefore
expect that the network/system affiliation be positively related to hospital uncompensated
care provision. Because we have missing values for 51 percent of the hospital-years, we
replace the network dummy variable with the prevalence of a network/system (measured
as percent of hospitals that belong to a network/system in the market). We hypothesize
that this variable will be positively associated with uncompensated care provision, given
that network/system hospitals tend to provide more uncompensated care than nonnetwork/system hospitals.

80.), these services tend to require higher technological investment and hence represent a good measure of
technological sophistication.
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We also control for major market area characteristics that affect hospital provision
of uncompensated care. A growing body of literature suggests that the level of hospital
competition and health maintenance organization (HMO) penetration greatly influence
hospitals’ ability to provide uncompensated care (Gruber 1994; Bazzoli, Lindrooth et al.
2006). Price shopping and cost control strategies adopted by managed care organizations
have increased price competition among hospitals. As market competition intensifies,
nonprofit hospitals’ ability to cross-subsidize uncompensated care decreases. However,
such care becomes more attractive for for-profit hospitals because the opportunity cost of
providing uncompensated care decreases. We therefore expect to see different behavioral
responses from hospitals of different ownerships in markets with various levels of HMO
penetration and market competition. We also include an interaction term between HMO
penetration and market competition to test if there are any interaction effects. As
suggested by previous studies, in markets where competition is already intense, HMO
penetration could reduce nonprofit hospitals’ capacity to provide uncompensated care
even further by shrinking their paying patient base (Mann, Melnick et al. 1997; Davidoff,
LoSasso et al. 2000). In addition, Davidoff et al. (2000) found that although market
competition has no effect on nonprofit hospitals at any level of HMO penetration, forprofit hospitals show a negative effect of competition on uncompensated care at all but
the highest level of penetration.
The key issue in measuring market competition and HMO penetration is defining
the appropriate hospital market area. Prior research suggests a number of ways to define
relevant hospital markets. Some studies choose geographic measures such as counties,
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), or Health Service Areas (HSAs) (Dranove,
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Shanley et al. 1992; Gaynor and Vogt 2000). Other studies define a fixed or variable
radius from each hospital as the relevant market area (Luft, Robinson et al. 1986; Gresenz,
Rogowski et al. 2004). Although these measures have the advantage of computational
ease, they are often considered to be arbitrary and sometimes underestimate the amount
of competition facing a hospital (Wong, Zhan et al. 2005). Another commonly used
method is to examine patient flows and define markets as consisting of geographic areas
(typically zip codes) that send a nontrivial number of patients to a given hospital. This
approach overcomes the disadvantages inherited in previous measures. However, using
patient flows has the potential for endogeneity bias when used to investigate the effects of
competition on hospital cost and quality (Wong, Zhan et al. 2005). Given the relative
merits and drawbacks of each approach, the current study defines hospital markets using
an exogenous measure - counties and a potential endogenous measure - patient flows
(please see Appendix B for a detailed account of this construction). We performed a
sensitivity analysis to select a superior measure between markets defined by counties and
markets defined by patient flows. The test did not, however, reveal significant differences
between these two measures (see Appendix C for detailed results from the sensitivity
analysis). We therefore use the market measure defined by patient flows in our final
analysis to avoid the arbitrariness of the county measure.
Once the relevant geographic market is defined, we are able to control for the
market competition by computing a Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) using hospital
market shares. HHI is a commonly used index to measure the degree of competition in a
given market area. It is derived by summing the squared market shares of each hospital in
the relevant market area:
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N

HHI = ∑ Si2
i =1

where Si is the percentage of hospital beds the i th hospital has. HHI ranges from
0 to 10,000 with 10,000 representing a monopoly and 0 being a hospital in a near
perfectly competitive market. As HHI increases, the competitiveness in the market
decreases. The U.S. Department of Justice (1992) considers a market with a HHI of less
than 1,000 to be a competitive marketplace. This index is calculated for each year, using
the full sample of hospitals. It is then rescaled to a range of 0 to 1.
HMO penetration is measured by the percentage of county population enrolled in
HMOs in 1998. This measure was extracted from the 2005 ARF data. Unfortunately, this
dataset does not give us access to the updated numbers for our study period. Since studies
have suggested an increasing trend for managed care enrollment (Bian and Morrisey
2006), we expect that our measure will likely underestimate the effect of managed care
organizations on the level of uncompensated care provision.
Socioeconomic characteristics of the surrounding community also affect hospital
provision of uncompensated care. The demand for uncompensated care is much greater in
communities with a large number of uninsured, lower income individuals and lower
percentage of elderly population. We therefore control for insurance coverage, per capita
income and percentage of population aged 65 or above. We obtain insurance coverage
information from the 2000 Census Small Area Health Insurance Estimates for Counties
and States (SAHIE). This measure is calculated as the percentage of county population
without health insurance. We generate comparable numbers for markets defined by
patient flows. However, with the steadily growing number of uninsured over the years,
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our year 2000 data will likely understate the demand for uncompensated care due to lack
of insurance. Per capita income for county markets is calculated by dividing the total
income by county population for each year. The same measure for markets based on
patient flows is calculated by adding all the income by market groups and total
population by market groups respectively, and then dividing total income by market
groups by total population by market groups. We use 2003 per capita income to replace
the 2004 numbers as the 2004 data are not available from the 2005 ARF. Percent of
population over age 65 is calculated using similar method for both county markets and
markets based on patient flows. As we only have the 2002 data on this variable, we use
the 2002 numbers for 2003 and 2004. We do expect that percentage of population over 65
is relatively stable over these three years.
We also control for whether a hospital is located in rural or urban areas. We
define rural/urban status using the Department of Agriculture’s rural-urban continuum
codes for metro and non-metro counties provided by the ARF data. These codes range
from one to nine, with one representing metro areas with a million population or more
and nine being completely rural with less than 2,500 urban population, and not adjacent
to a metro area. Appendix D provides a complete list of rural-urban continuum codes.
Tables 5 presents the independent variables and the expected sign of their effects
on uncompensated care based on the above discussion.
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Table 5: Predicted Effects on Uncompensated Care Provision
Uncompensated Care
Nonprofit
For-profit

Variables
Regulatory Measures
CON
POOL
REQUIREMENT
CON*POOL
CON* REQUIREMENT
POOL*REQUIREMENT
CON*POOL* REQUIREMENT

+
+
+
+
+/+/+/-

+/+
+/+/+/+/+/-

Hospital Characteristics
Teaching hospital status
Proportion public hospital
Technology intensity
Hospital size
ER
Proportion network/system

+
+
+
+
-

+
+
+
+
-

+
-

+
-

+

+

-

-

Market Characteristics
HHI
HMO penetration
Percentage of population aged 65 or
above
Per capita income
Percentage of population that are
uninsured
Rural
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Descriptive Statistics
Table 6 defines each variable and Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics for
our full sample. These data represent means across three years, treating each hospitalyear combination as a separate observation.
Over the three year period, our full sample has 4,324 hospital-year observations,
which includes 1,552 hospitals in 2002, 1,508 hospitals in 2003, as well as 1,264
hospitals in 2004. The figures show that, for example, in 2003, there are about 69%
nonprofit hospitals in our sample, as compared to 62 percent nationally; 19% public
hospitals, as compared to 20% nationally; and 12 percent for-profit hospitals, as
compared to 18 percent nationally. We slightly over-sampled nonprofit hospitals and
under-sampled for-profit hospitals. For all hospital-year observations, we have about 19
percent public hospitals, 70 percent nonprofits and 11 percent for-profit hospitals, with
nonprofit hospitals slightly over-represented. Also note that public hospitals are included
in the full sample for the purpose of comparison among different types of hospitals. They
are however excluded from the analytical sample because we use percent of public
hospitals in the market as a control variable.
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Table 6: Variables and Their Definitions
Variables

Definition

Dependent Variables
Selfpay/Charity

Number of admissions that are for self-pay/charity care patients

Percent Selfpay/Charity

Percentage of admissions that are for self-pay/charity care patients

Regulatory Measures
CON

Certificate of Need

REQUIREMENT

Community benefit requirement

POOL

Uncompensated care pool

Hospital Characteristics
Teaching hospital status

Dummy variable representing teaching hospital status

Public Hospital_county

Proportion of public hospitals in the market (by counties)

Public Hospital_market

Proportion of public hospitals in the market (by patient flows)

Technology intensity

Number of hi-tech services offered

Hospital size

Hospital bed size

ER

Dummy variable indicating whether a hospital has an Emergency Department

Network/system_county

Proportion of system/network members in markets defined by counties

Network/system_market

Proportion of system/network members in markets defined by patient flows

Market Characteristics
HHI_county

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (based on county)

HHI_market

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (based on patient flows)

HMO penetration_county

Proportion of population in the market (based on county) enrolled in HMO

HMO penetration_market

Proportion of population in the market (based on patient flows)enrolled in HMO

Percentage of population 65+_county

Percentage of population aged 65 or above

Percentage of population 65+_market

Percentage of population aged 65 or above

Per capita income_county

Per capita income (1,000)

Per capita income_market

Per capita income (1,000)

Percent uninsured_county

Percentage of population that are uninsured

Percent uninsured_market

Percentage of population that are uninsured

Rural

Rural/Urban continuum
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample
Variables

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Selfpay/Charity

4324

443.37

805.14

0

14215

Percent Selfpay/Charity

4324

5

6

0

100 ‡‡‡‡

CON

4324

9.31

6.64

0

21.60

REQUIREMENT

4324

0.35

0.75

0

3

POOL

4324

0.70

0.93

0

2

Teaching hospital status

4324

0.26

0.44

0

1

Public Hospital_county

4324

3

8

0

29

Public Hospital_market

4324

3

6

0

76

Technology intensity

2385

2.10

1.41

0

5

Dependent Variables

Regulatory Measures

Hospital Characteristics

0

§§§§

Hospital size

4324

220.99

265.32

ER

3706

0.98

0.13

0

1

Network/system_county

4324

10

39

0

87

Network/system_market

4324

10

30

0

41

HHI_county

4324

0.50

0.35

0

1

HHI_market

4324

0.31

0.29

0.05

1

HMO penetration_county

4324

0.25

0.18

3.8

0.96

HMO penetration_market

4324

0.28

0.17

0

0.96

Percentage of population 65+_county

4324

14

4

6.54

34

Percentage of population 65+_market

4324

13.97

3.94

6.53

34.24

Per capita income_county

4324

29.64

9.51

14.80

84.59

Per capita income_market

4324

30.63

9.03

14.80

84.59

Percent uninsured_county

4324

13.65

4.12

5.4

29.50

Percent uninsured_market

4324

13.44

3.77

13.52

25.70

Rural

4324

3.24

2.41

1

9

2163

Market Characteristics

‡‡‡‡

A nonprofit hospital that is excluded later in the analysis because of possible reporting error from the
hospital.
§§§§
A public hospital that reported zero beds. Public hospitals are excluded in the analysis.
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The next set of tables (Tables 8.1 – 8.3) report full sample summary statistics by
hospital status: public, nonprofit, and for-profit. It shows that on average, a slightly
higher percentage (6%) of admissions in public and for-profit hospitals are for the
uninsured patients than those in nonprofit hospitals (5%). Figure 2 and 3 further illustrate
the distribution of total number of admissions for the uninsured by ownership types in
2002. This pattern remains largely unchanged for 2003 and 2004 (Appendix E). In the
aggregate, nonprofit hospitals consistently have the most uninsured admissions (68-70
percent) compared with public (11-14 percent) and for-profit hospitals (16-21 percent).
This is partly because the majority of U.S. hospitals are nonprofits.
The summary tables also show that on average, nonprofit hospitals tend to be
larger (as measured in number of beds) and are more technologically sophisticated than
public or for-profit hospitals.
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Table 8.1: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample by Hospital Ownership Status
(Public)
Variables

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Number of Self-pay/Charity

826

495.77

1350.11

0

14215

Percent of Self-pay/Charity

826

6

7

0

71

CON

826

9.92

6.21

0

21.6

REQUIREMENT

826

0.16

0.57

0

3

POOL

826

0.42

0.77

0

2

Teaching hospital status

826

0.16

0.37

0

1

Technology intensity

461

1.58

1.27

0

5

Hospital size

826

143.69

224.77

0

1839

ER

715

0.98

0.13

0

1

Network/system_county

826

5

15

0

36

Network/system_market

826

6

21

0

41

HHI_county

826

0.64

0.36

0.05

1

HHI_market

826

0.36

0.33

0.03

1

HMO penetration_county

826

0.13

0.13

0

0.66

HMO penetration_market

826

0.21

0.15

0

0.66

Percentage of population 65+_county

826

15

4

7

30

Percentage of population 65+_market

826

13.92

3.58

6.54

31.58

Per capita income_county

826

26.52

7.71

14.30

84.59

Per capita income_market

826

28.90

8.04

16.05

84.59

Percent uninsured_county

826

14.80

4.54

4.4

26.9

Percent uninsured_market

826

14.11

4.21

5.5

24.76

Rural

826

4.85

2.57

1

9

2002

826

0.35

0.48

0

1

2003

826

0.34

0.47

0

1

2004

826

0.31

0.46

0

1
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Table 8.2: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample by Hospital Ownership Status
(Nonprofit)
Variables

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Number of Self-pay/Charity

2962

434.68

636.01

0

5844

Percent of Self-pay/Charity

2962

5

5

0

100

CON

2962

9.50

6.81

0

21.6

REQUIREMENT

2962

0.44

0.78

0

3

POOL

2962

0.83

0.97

0

2

Teaching hospital status

2962

0.31

0.46

0

1

Public Hospital_county

2962

1

7

0

29.4

Public Hospital_market

2962

2

6

0

76

Technology intensity

1674

2.26

1.44

0

5

Hospital size

2962

251.38

288.31

6

2163

ER

2634

0.99

0.12

0

1

Network/system_county

2962

13

46

0

87

Network/system_market

2962

12

34

0

41

HHI_county

2962

0.48

0.34

0.05

1

HHI_market

2962

0.30

0.28

0.03

1

HMO penetration_county

2962

0.27

0.18

0

0.96

HMO penetration_market

2962

0.30

0.17

0

0.96

Percentage of population 65+_county

2962

14

4

0.03

0.34

Percentage of population 65+_market

2962

13.69

3.48

7.15

34.24

Per capita income_county

2962

30.64

10.12

14.80

84.59

Per capita income_market

2962

31.35

9.62

14.80

84.59

Percent uninsured_county

2962

13.01

3.97

3.8

29.5

Percent uninsured_market

2962

12.89

3.59

5.4

25.7

Rural

2962

2.94

2.25

1

9

2002

2962

0.37

0.48

0

1

2003

2962

0.35

0.48

0

1

2004

2962

0.28

0.45

0

1
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Table 8.3: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample by Hospital Ownership Status
(For-profit)
Variables

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Number of Self-pay/Charity

536

410.70

427.47

0

4070

Percent of Self-pay/Charity

536

6

6

0

55

CON

536

7.35

5.95

0

20.7

REQUIREMENT

536

0.19

0.68

0

3

POOL

536

0.44

0.76

0

2

Teaching hospital status

536

0.11

0.32

0

1

Public Hospital_county

536

1

0.02

0

12

Public Hospital_market

536

1

0.02

0

9

Technology intensity

250

2.02

1.19

0

5

Hospital size

536

172.18

118.89

6

655

ER

357

0.96

0.20

0

1

Network/system_county

536

4

0.10

0

84

Network/system_market

536

4

0.07

0

49

HHI_county

536

0.40

0.33

0.05

1

HHI_market

536

0.24

0.24

0.03

1

HMO penetration_county

536

0.29

0.19

0

0.64

HMO penetration_market

536

0.30

0.18

0.01

0.61

Percentage of population 65+_county

536

15

6

4

34

Percentage of population 65+_market

536

15.55

5.97

8.15

34.24

Per capita income_county

536

28.93

7.14

13.52

49.54

Per capita income_market

536

29.28

6.12

17.56

49.54

Percent uninsured_county

536

15.39

3.33

6.5

25.3

Percent uninsured_market

536

15.44

3.16

8.27

24.76

Rural

536

2.43

1.88

1

9

2002

536

0.33

0.47

0

1

2003

536

0.34

0.47

0

1

2004

536

0.34

0.47

0

1
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Figure 2: Hospital Provision of Uncompensated Care 2002

Figure 3: Percent of Uncompensated Care Admissions by Ownership Types
2002
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Table 9 presents summary statistics for the final study sample by nonprofit/forprofit status, after all the missing values for technology intensity variable and ER variable
are excluded. This sample has 2,235 nonprofit observations and 295 for-profit
observations that are representative of nonprofit and for-profit hospitals of all sizes in the
U.S. Table 10 compares hospitals in our study sample in 2003 with those nationally with
regard to size (as measured in number of beds) and location (as indicated by rural/urban).
Our two-sample paired t test fails to find any significant differences between the study
sample and national statistics, indicating that our nonprofit and for-profit samples mirror
the U.S. hospitals of all sizes and in rural/urban areas (test results are reported in
Appendix F). Additionally, the summary statistics are not significantly different from the
full sample statistics. Nonprofit hospitals are still found to provide, on average, a higher
volume of admissions for the uninsured but a slightly lower percentage than their forprofit counterparts. They tend to be larger, more technologically sophisticated and more
likely to have an Emergency Department.
We further examined the regulatory variations by ownership status. Tables 11.1 –
11.3 and 12.1 – 12.3 represent intensity variations of each regulation across all hospitals
by ownership types. In the nonprofit sample, 28.9 percent of the hospitals are located in
non-CON states and the remaining 71.1 percent in states with CON of varying intensities.
74.5 percent of the nonprofit hospitals are in states without a community benefit
requirement regulation. More than half of the nonprofit hospitals are found in states that
do not have an uncompensated care pool. In the for-profit sample, 20.7 percent of the
hospitals are located in non-CON states. 88.1 percent of the for-profit hospitals are in
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states without a community benefit requirement regulation. 71 percent of the for-profit
hospitals are found in states without an uncompensated care pool.
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Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for the Final Study Sample by Nonprofit/For-profit
Status
Nonprofit

For-profit

Variables

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

Number of Self-pay/Charity

476.98

705.25

0

9370

395.11

346.24

0

1613

Percent of Self-pay/Charity

4.62

4.90

0

100

5.19

3.94

0

25.66

CON

8.91

7.01

0

20.7

7.90

6.53

0

20.7

REQUIREMENT

0.39

0.74

0

3

0.26

0.78

0

3

POOL

0.80

0.95

0

2

0.45

0.75

0

2

Teaching hospital status

0.30

0.46

0

1

0.09

0.29

0

1

Public Hospital_county

0.90

2.78

0

19.63

0.75

2.10

0

12.22

Public Hospital_market

1.51

2.61

0

19.63

1.34

2.05

0

8.83

Technology intensity

2.15

1.37

0

5.00

2.11

1.18

0

5.00

216.86

215.09

6

2163

159.02

104.71

6

655

ER

0.99

0.12

0

1

0.97

0.18

0

1

Network/system_county

9.50

15.80

0

109.90

5.21

11.23

0

84.39

Network/system_market

9.36

12.78

0

90.91

4.70

8.12

0

49.07

HHI_county

0.52

0.34

0.05

1

0.44

0.32

0.05

1

HHI_market

0.32

0.30

0.03

1

0.26

0.24

0.03

1

HMO penetration_county

0.26

0.18

0

0.8

0.27

0.19

0.01

0.64

HMO penetration_market

0.29

0.18

0

0.8

0.29

0.18

0.01

0.61

Percentage of population 65+_county

13.84

3.62

3.00

32.02

15.50

6.00

6.40

33.77

Percentage of population 65+_market

13.70

3.34

7.15

34.24

15.94

6.28

8.15

34.24

Per capita income_county

30.26

9.22

14.80

84.59

28.45

6.91

17.56

47.45

Per capita income_market

30.98

8.66

14.80

84.59

28.83

6.05

17.56

44.12

Percent uninsured_county

12.70

3.93

3.8

29.5

14.85

3.11

7.8

23.5

Percent uninsured_market

12.60

3.48

5.4

25.3

14.97

2.98

8.90

23.32

Rural

3.09

2.29

1

9

2.56

1.87

1

9

2002

0.35

0.48

0

1

0.31

0.46

0

1

2003

0.36

0.48

0

1

0.40

0.49

0

1

2004

0.29

0.45

0

1

0.29

0.46

0

1

Hospital size

2235

72

295

Table 10: Comparing Hospitals in Final Study Sample and in U.S. in 2003

Nonprofit Percent of beds

Percent of
urban
N
For-profit Percent of beds

0-49
50-99
100-199
200-399
>=400

Sample
17%
16%
25%
27%
15%
67%

U.S.
23%
19%
24%
25%
9%
62%

0-49
50-99
100-199
200-399
>=400

807
13%
19%
36%
31%
2%
74%

2,794
22%
20%
34%
20%
4%
73%

118

667

Percent of
urban
N

73

Table 11.1: Nonprofit Hospital Distribution by Regulatory Intensity
Certificate-of-Need (CON)
CON Intensity Index

Freq.

Percent

0
3.5
4.8
6.3
8.1
12.1
12.8
14.4
15
15.2
16
18.4
20.7

646
21
171
151
170
167
91
128
212
23
185
177
93

28.9
0.94
7.65
6.76
7.61
7.47
4.07
5.73
9.49
1.03
8.28
7.92
4.16

Total

2,235

100

Table 11.2: Community Benefit Requirement
Community Benefit Requirement Intensity Index

Freq.

Percent

0
1
2
3

1,665
299
235
36

74.5
13.38
10.51
1.61

Total

2,235

100

Table 11.3: Uncompensated Care Pool
Uncompensated Care Pool Intensity Index

Freq.

Percent

0
1
2

1,280
114
841

57.27
5.1
37.63

Total

2,235

100

74

Table 12.1: For-profit Hospital Distribution by Regulatory Intensity
Certificate-of-Need (CON)
CON Intensity Index

Freq.

Percent

0
3.5
4.8
6.3
12.1
12.8
14.4
15
16
18.4
20.7

61
9
10
136
3
7
3
2
21
14
29

20.68
3.05
3.39
46.1
1.02
2.37
1.02
0.68
7.12
4.75
9.83

Total

295

100

Table 12.2: Community Benefit Requirement
Community Benefit Requirement Intensity Index

Freq.

Percent

0
1
2
3

260
13
2
20

88.14
4.41
0.68
6.78

Total

295

100

Table 12.3: Uncompensated Care Pool
Uncompensated Care Pool Intensity Index

Freq.

Percent

0
1
2

210
38
47

71.19
12.88
15.93

Total

295

100
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CHAPTER FIVE
ESTIMATION AND RESULTS

Estimation
We use panel data for our analysis because they present several advantages over
cross section or time series data. Cross section data measure an observation at a point in
time and time series data follows an observation across time, while panel data combine
cross section and time series data. As a result, our sample size increases because an
observation was repeatedly measured at different points in time. Additionally, since we
follow the same cross section unit over time, we are able to obtain consistent estimators
in the presence of omitted variables using proper panel data techniques.
There is some concern that omitted variables might be a problem because some
hospital characteristics might not be observable or measurable. In other words, there is a
hospital specific latent variable α i as defined in the component error term ε it :

UCit = β0 + β1Hospitalit + β2Marketit + β3Regulationit+β4Year+ β5State+ ε it
where ε it = α i + ηit . This latent variable can be, for example, the preferences of hospital
administrators/boards of trustees towards uncompensated care provision, or hospital
managerial quality or structure that tend to be constant over time. Depending on whether
this unobserved α i is correlated with some right-hand side hospital specific explanatory
variables such as size, structure (i.e., whether the hospital maintains an emergency
department) or technological sophistication, we test different estimation methods: pooled
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Ordinary Least Squares or pooled OLS, random effects Generalized Least Squares (GLS),
and a Hausman Taylor instrumental variable (HTIV) approach.

Three Estimation Approaches: Pooled OLS, GLS and HTIV
The general form of our empirical model can be expressed as

Yit = X it β + ε it

t=1, 2, 3

(1)

ε it = α i + ηit
ε it is a composite error term which represents the sum of the unobserved effect
and an idiosyncratic error. We first estimate our empirical model using a pooled OLS.
The pooled OLS estimator requires no correlation between X it and ε it (i.e., E( X it ' ε it )=0
and E( X it ' α i )=0) to obtain a consistent estimator of β in model (1). This estimator,
however, ignores hospital specific unobserved effects.
We then re-estimate the model using an improved estimation --- random effect
GLS that controls for random hospital specific effects using variation over both time and
cross sectional units to estimate the parameter β vector. In addition, it exploits the serial
correlation in the composite error ε it = α i + ηit to produce more efficient estimators than
pooled OLS or fixed effects. Similar to pooled OLS, it also requires orthogonality
between α i and X it . In other words, both pooled OLS and random effects GLS rely on
the assumption that unobservable hospital characteristics are not correlated with our
right-hand side variables.
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However, there is concern that such a correlation might exist. Some evidence
suggests that the hospital industry, acting as a powerful interest group, is able to influence
state policy making such as the adoption of CON regulations so that the hospitals can
preserve a profitable patient mix or volume (Wendling and Werner 1980; Lanning,
Morrisey et al. 1991). Although such a concern might be legitimate, there is also
evidence suggesting that a state’s adoption of such regulations is motivated by its concern
over inefficiency or market failure in the system rather than pure interest group transfers
(Cone and Dranove, 1986; Morrisey and Ohsfeldt, 1991). As previously discussed in the
theory of regulation and hospital regulation in particular (Chapter 2), a state’s decision to
adopt certain policies can be viewed as in the public interest. For example, CON approval
by regulators is made contingent, through formal conditions or informal negotiation,
upon the willingness of the hospital to provide services (e.g., uncompensated care) that
are perceived by the regulators as in the public interest (Salkever, 2000). Therefore,
industry capture might not be a concern if adoption of these policies is intended to amend
market failure and is meant to protect the public interest. However, if we allow for the
possibility of interest group influence and relax the assumption of strict exogeneity, our
regulations will be endogenous as they are correlated with the latent hospital
characteristics α i . In other words, if the industry capture theory holds true, unobserved
hospital motivations to lobby for regulations might influence the level of uncompensated
care they ultimately provide (by the patient mix/volume they choose).
To allow such a correlation, we re-estimate the empirical model with a HausmanTaylor instrumental variables procedure (HTIV) that relaxes the independence
assumption by allowing unobservable hospital characteristics to be correlated with our
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right-hand side variables. Some previous studies have used fixed effects to eliminate
potential endogeneity resulting from this omitted latent variable problem. However, fixed
effects estimation removes time constant variables, such as the regulatory variables in our
model. As we only have recent years of hospital discharge data, the lack of variation in
the regulatory variables over time will prohibit us from estimating their impact on
hospital behaviors with fixed effects estimation. Fortunately, Hausman and Taylor (1981)
proposed a model that conveniently solves the potential correlation between omitted
variables and the explanatory variables but still allows us to estimate the effects of time
constant variables of interest.
In a Hausman-Taylor procedure, the general form of our empirical model can be
expressed as:

Yit = X it β + Z i γ + ε it ,

(1)

ε it = α i + ηit
where i = 1 to N and, t = 1 to T; β and γ are k and g vectors of coefficients associated
with time varying ( X it ) and time-invariant ( Z i ) observable variables respectively. In our
case, X it will contain variables such as percentage of network/system in the market,
percentage of public hospitals in the market, HHI, per capita income, uninsurance rate,
teaching status, technology intensity, bed size, ER, HMO penetration, and percentage of
population over 65, while matrix Z i will include regulatory measures and state dummies.
Intuitively the Hausman-Taylor procedure follows an instrumental variable
approach. It uses variables in the model as instruments for the endogenous time-invariant
variables. This has the advantage over traditional instrumental variables methods in that it
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does not rely on excluded exogenous instruments which are usually difficult to obtain.
However, the Hausman-Taylor procedure does require a priori information: the ability to
distinguish columns of X and Z which are asymptotically correlated with α i from
those which are not. In our application, we have reason to believe that hospital
characteristics such as technology intensity, size, and whether a hospital has an
Emergency Department are influenced by the latent individual hospital effect. CON laws
may also be correlated if we further assume that unobserved hospital motivation to lobby
for CON also influences the level of uncompensated care they ultimately provide (by the
patient mix/volume they choose). However, percent of network/system in the market,
percent of public hospitals in the market, HHI, percentage of population that are
uninsured, other regulations, state dummies, HMO and percent of population over 65 are
not correlated.
Once we distinguish the time-varying/time invariant, exogenous/endogenous
variables, X it and Z i can be further partitioned as X it = ( xit1 , xit 2 ) and Z i = ( z i1 , z i 2 ) ,
where xit1 is a 1 × k1 time-varying exogenous vector, xit 2 a 1 × k 2 time-varying
endogenous vector, z i1 a 1× g1 time-invariant exogenous vector, and zi 2 a 1 × g 2 timeinvariant endogenous vector. A vector of deviations from means averaged over time Qv
was used as part of the instruments to transform equation (1). Thus by construction, Qv is
orthogonal to any time-invariant vector of observations (i.e., Qv Z i = 0 and Qvα i = 0 ).
Unfortunately, since Qv is also orthogonal to Z i , which violates the requirement that
instruments be correlated with all the endogenous variables, Hausman and Taylor (1981)
added the columns of xit1 and zi1 so that we now have the matrix [Qv M X it1 M Z i1 ] as
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instruments. However, one necessary condition for all the parameters in equation (1) to
be identified is k1 ≥ g 2 , Recall that the vector with 1 × k1 time-varying exogenous
variables is xit1 which includes eight variables (per capita income, percent of
network/system in the market, percent of public hospitals in the market, HHI, percentage
of population that are uninsured, HMO, teaching, and percent of population over 65). The
vector with 1 × g 2 time-invariant endogenous variables is zi 2 that includes seven
regulatory variables and their interactions (see Table Z). Thus our model is overidentified ( k1 > g 2 ). However, some of the time varying exogenous variables have low
variation across the study period, which prohibits the HTIV model from constructing
strong internal instruments. Percent of public hospital and teaching have zero variation
for about half of the study sample. In addition, all of the over time variation for variables
HMO penetration, percent of population over 65 and percent uninsured comes from
population adjustment, which further weakens the identification. Specifically, these
variables are constructed in the following ways. For example, for the HMO penetration
variable, we take the year when county level data on this variable are available and
multiply it by the county population for each year to obtain the number of people enrolled
in HMO plans each year. We then sum the total number of enrollees in the market
defined by patient flows and divide it by the total population in that market for each study
year. As a result, a small amount of within group or over time variation was introduced in
the market level HMO penetration variable, which is used in the analysis. Although this
is the best we can achieve with the existing county level data to obtain the market level
HMO penetration, percent of population over 65, and uninsurance rate, we need to be
cautious about the potential problems this manipulation could create. The amount of the
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variation created by our population adjustment is low and does not represent the true
underlying changes in variable trends over time. Even though the real HMO penetration,
percent of population over 65, and percent of population uninsured in different years
would also reflect population changes, our adjustment yields variations that are not the
same as having information on the changes in the real underlying variable. As a result,
the Hausman Taylor procedure will still use these variables as instruments despite their
low over-time variation, but may not perform well: low variation could result in weak
identification, and hence large standard errors. In addition, because not all three variables
are affected by population growth trend in the same way, a new bias is introduced and
creates a measurement error that may bias the Hausman Taylor estimates.
Table 13: List of Time Varying/Invariant and Endogenous/exogenous Variables
Time Varying Variables
(X)

Time Invariant Variables
(Z)

Endogenous
Emergency Department

Exogenous
Percent network

technology intensity
hospital size

Percent of public hospital
Teaching
HHI
HMO penetration*
Percent over 65*
Per capita income
Percent uninsured*
Rural

CON
Pool
Requirement
CON*Pool
CON*Requirement
Pool*Requirement
All three

*Within group variation represents population weighted averages.
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Cluster Correlated Errors
The model is also examined for cluster correlated errors. Clustering can occur
when residuals of hospitals within the same state correlate with each other. This
intragroup correlation of the errors may create a clustering effect that could produce
inconsistent estimates of the covariance matrix. One assumption for the Hausman-Taylor
model to produce consistent and efficient parameter estimates is that the idiosyncratic
errors are homoskedastic, with zero mean and constant variance across time and
individuals (i.e., η it ~ iid (0, ση )). In the presence of clustered errors, the off-diagonal
2

elements of the covariance matrix might not be zero due to potential correlations of the
errors among hospitals within the same state. In addition, the diagonal elements might not
be identical since the clustering of hospitals by states might lead to different variances
along the diagonals of the covariance matrix. As a result, the parameter estimates will be
inefficient although they are still consistent.
The Breusch-Pagan (1980) Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) and Cook-Weisberg tests
are performed on the pooled cross-sectional final sample to test for state effects in the
form of cluster correlated errors. Under the null hypothesis, both tests follow a Chisquare distribution. We should note that the LM test is not designed specifically to test
for cluster-correlated errors. It captures other types of heteroskedasticity as well. Table 14
presents the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test statistics. The critical value for the Chisquared distribution with 30 degrees of freedom is 43.77. The table therefore shows that
with a test statistics of 3674.05, there is almost no probability that the distribution is Chisquared. The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected, meaning there is some
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evidence that the errors are correlated or heteroskedastic. A robust cluster estimator of
the variance covariance matrix should be used to correct for the estimated residuals.

Table 14: Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroskedasticity
Uncompensated Care
Final Sample

chi2(30)

= 3674.05, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

However, the literature reveals no commonly adopted corrections to obtain robust
cluster estimators for the Hausman-Taylor procedure. Thus, the HTIV estimator does not
correct for cluster correlated errors. Because such a robust estimator exists in the pooled
OLS and the random effects GLS model, we report robust variance matrix estimator for
these estimation procedures.
A Test for Endogeneity
The Hausman test is devised for a number of model specifications in
econometrics including endogeneity as a result of unobserved individual factors
(Hausman 1978). To the extent that unobserved hospital heterogeneity remains an
omitted influence on our right hand side variables, we conduct the Hausman test using
the property of fixed effects (FE) estimation *****. FE will produce consistent parameter
estimates in the presence of endogeneity as a result of unobserved hospital effects.
However, in the absence of such an endogeneity and/or the presence of cluster correlated

*****

FE will only be used for the purpose of the specification test and not as part of the estimation
procedure because FE does not allow us to estimate the coefficients on the regulatory variables.
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errors, such estimates will be asymptotically inefficient. Similar to FE, an HTIV
estimator is consistent under both the null and alternative hypothesis. On the other hand,
under the hypothesis of no misspecification (i.e., no latent hospital effects), random effect
GLS models will yield consistent and asymptotically efficient estimators, where
efficiency is defined as attaining the asymptotic Cramer-Rao upper/lower bound. We
therefore utilize the properties of these three estimators (FE, HTIV and GLS) to construct
several tests of misspecification.
Results
The Hausman test based on the difference between FE and GLS estimates yields
χ2 =45.02 with 12 degrees of freedom which is significant (p=0) for the nonprofit
hospitals sample (Table 15.1). This rejects the null that there is no correlation between
the individual hospital effects and explanatory variables. In other words, there is evidence
that latent individual effects exist and GLS will yield inconsistent parameter estimates.
The Hausman test based on the difference between FE and HTIV estimator yields χ2 =1.5
with one degree of freedom which is not significant at the 5% level (p=0.22) (Table 15.2).
The same tests yield similar results for the for-profit hospital sample. The Hausman test
based on the difference between FE and GLS estimates yields χ2 =35.9 with 11 degrees of
freedom which is significant (Table 15.3) and χ2 =4.26 with two degrees of freedom
which is not significant at the 5% level (p=0.12) when testing for the difference between
FE and HTIV estimators (Table 15.4) Results from the Hausman tests justify the use of
the HTIV method.
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Table 15.1: Hausman Test for Nonprofit Hospitals: FE vs. GLS
Number of Admissions

(b)

(B)

(b-B)

sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))

Technology Intensity

a
-6.25

b
18.48

Difference
-24.72

S.E.
13.07

26.53
-64.72
-22.53
0.71
-1.33
191.62
-27.63
-0.31
56.46
-283.09
62.61

47.49
37.62
-38.76
1.68
-1.56
-148.73
-3.23
-1.04
-0.63
10.37
-21.79

-20.95
-102.34
16.23
-0.96
0.22
340.35
-24.40
0.73
57.09
-293.46
84.41

28.39
57.10
10.76
0.25
1.23
318.43
43.40
165.34
12.90
318.98
108.46

ER
Teaching hospital status
Proportion with public owner
Hospital size
Proportion network/system member
HHI
HMO penetration
Percentage of population 65+
Per capita income
Percent uninsured
Rural

b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not
systematic
chi2(12) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
=
45.02
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
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Table 15.2: Hausman Test for Nonprofit Hospitals: FE vs. HTIV
Number of Admissions

(b)

(B)

(b-B)

sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))

a

b

Difference

S.E.

-6.25

-2.50

-3.75

4.80

ER
Teaching hospital status
Proportion with public owner
Hospital size
Proportion network/system member
HHI
HMO penetration
Percentage of population 65+
Per capita income

26.53
-64.72
-22.53
0.71
-1.33
191.62
-27.63
-0.31
56.46

26.06
-56.88
-19.33
0.72
-1.57
172.02
-18.65
-108.47
54.48

0.47
-7.84
-3.19
-0.01
0.23
19.60
-8.99
108.15
1.98

13.92
14.65
3.73
0.05
0.41
64.69
31.93
93.76
2.96

Percent uninsured

-283.09

31.11

-314.20

289.77

62.61

16.60

46.01

48.55

Technology Intensity

Rural

b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xthtaylor
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2(1) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
=
1.50
Prob>chi2 = 0.2201
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Table 15.3: Hausman Test for For-profit Hospitals: FE vs. GLS
Number of Admissions

(b)

(B)

(b-B)

sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))

Technology Intensity

a
-42.28

b
22.03

Difference
-64.31

S.E.
16.72

ER
Teaching hospital status
Proportion with public owner
Hospital size
Proportion network/system member
HHI
HMO penetration
Percentage of population 65+
Per capita income
Percent uninsured

-9.16
-59.30
-41.11
0.04
-3.09
-131.55
230.54
390.48
25.91
91.35

87.95
-64.21
-14.24
1.14
-1.59
-59.99
-0.78
-1.51
9.88
34.12

-97.11
4.91
-26.87
-1.10
-1.50
-71.56
231.32
391.99
16.03
57.23

43.03
99.11
38.20
0.27
5.97
763.52
122.36
476.92
22.69
416.74

b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2(11) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
=
35.90
Prob>chi2 = 0.0002
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Table 15.4: Hausman Test for For-profit Hospitals: FE vs. HTIV
Number of Admissions

(b)

(B)

(b-B)

sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))

a

b

Difference

S.E.

Technology Intensity

-42.28

-40.34

-1.94

15.58

ER
Teaching hospital status
Proportion with public owner
Hospital size
Proportion network/system member
HHI
HMO penetration
Percentage of population 65+
Per capita income

-9.16
-59.30
-41.11
0.04
-3.09
-131.55
230.54
390.48
25.91

-10.85
-53.72
-40.04
0.07
-5.17
-58.81
14.96
45.95
25.97

1.69
-5.57
-1.07
-0.03
2.08
-72.74
215.59
344.53
-0.06

54.64
74.55
26.43
0.21
4.36
498.27
119.85
471.01
14.88

91.35

98.22

-6.87

393.55

Percent uninsured

b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xthtaylor
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
=
4.26
Prob>chi2 = 0.1188

However, some important caveats should be noted. First, HTIV estimation has
weak identification due to data limitations. Some time-varying exogenous variables
which the HTIV procedure uses to construct internal instruments have low variation. In
addition, variables such as uninsurance rate, percent of population over 65 and HMO
penetration are adjusted by population growth due to lack of data for some study years.
Specifically, we computed values for 2003 and 2004 market level variables using the
2002 county level data. As a result, the internal instruments constructed based on these
population adjusted variables not reflect the true underlying changes in the HMO
penetration, percent over 65, and uninsurance rate. However, these internal instruments
are not completely invalid because even real changes in these variables reflect population
changes over time to some extent because changes in population could change the
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percentage of HMO penetration, population that are over 65 or uninsurance rate.
However, this manipulation of multiplying all three variables by the same growth trend
likely introduces a new measurement bias to the parameter estimates. Second, there may
be potential misclassification of endogenous/exogenous variables. Third, comparing FE
and HTIV estimators, a few coefficient estimates such as the uninsurance rate in the
nonprofit model and the percent of population over 65 in the for-profit model exhibit
large differences. However, most of the estimates are similar in both magnitude and sign.
Table 16 and Table 17 present results from the GLS and HTIV estimation
respectively. Pooled OLS results are reported in Appendix G. Even though the Hausman
specification tests show evidence of inconsistency, the GLS procedure yields meaningful
estimates. First, all the significant regulatory variables in the GLS model are of similar
signs to those in the HTIV model, which, despite its problems discussed previously, are
not significantly different from the consistent but less efficient FE model as shown by the
Hausman test. Second, comparing with the HTIV results, endogeneity due to omitted
variables or unobserved heterogeneity seems to bias our GLS estimates for the regulatory
variables downward for the nonprofit hospital sample. This may suggest that the
magnitude of the true regulatory effects might be even larger than what we have
estimated using the GLS procedure. Significant variables therefore in our GLS model
could be even more significant if the magnitude of the true effects are greater. For the
for-profit hospital sample, the comparison of GLS vs. HTIV again shows that GLS tends
to underestimate the magnitude of the true regulatory effects but the HTIV estimates are
extremely large. It is not clear to us whether the large HTIV estimates for the regulatory
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variables in the for-profit model result from the problem discussed previously or the
limited sample size (N=295).
Given the caveats of each model, findings are reported based on the GLS
estimation and validated by the HTIV estimates. Even though both the GLS and HTIV
methods have their limitations, our cross-validation provides a way to overcome some of
the drawbacks. A comparison of the fixed effects estimation with the HTIV using the
Hausman test shows that most of the HTIV estimates are consistent despite the problems
with identification and measurement. A comparison of the GLS and HTIV estimates
gives us some information on the direction of the bias for the GLS model. Results from
these analyses should however be interpreted with caution.
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Table 16: GLS Results for Hospital Provision of Uncompensated Care
Nonprofit
Variables

For-profit

Number of
Admissions
10.73**

Percent of
Admissions
0.07**

Number of
Admissions
3.95

Percent of
Admissions
0.25***

9.71

-0.63***

-42.34***

0.69***

51.55*

0.51*

-131.97***

1.14*

-1.91
26.82***
46.33
-20.49***

0.02
0.14***
0.35
-0.11

18.67***
231.69***
-19.57***

0.004
-0.12
0.03

35.57
19.61
56.27

-0.26**
0.28
0.22

39.37
51.08
-28.81

-0.36**
0.19
-0.18

-2383.43***

-7.35

-872.67

-1.66

1.60***

-0.001

0.97***

-0.004***

-191.01

-2.79*

-254.34

-6.12

-62.6

-0.21

-148.07**

0.31

HMO penetration

-214.63***

-1.68

-123.36

2.87

Percentage of population
65+
Per capita income

-11.23***

-0.06

0.25

-0.08

-2.27

-0.004

8.03**

0.06

Percent uninsured

3.42

0.17

36.24***

0.06

Rural

-0.56

0.02

-19.28

0.67

37.17**
81.56***
123.27

0.07
0.18
3.78***

34.40**
108.85***
-578.55***

0.34
1.07
-2.48

CON
REQUIREMENT
POOL
CON*REQUIREMENT
CON*POOL
POOL*REQUIREMENT
CON*REQUIREMENT*PO
OL
Technology Intensity
ER
Teaching hospital status
Proportion with public
owner
Hospital size
Proportion network/system
member
HHI

2003
2004
Constant
N

2235

*p≤.10; **p≤.05; ***p≤.01
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295

Table 17: HTIV Results for Hospital Provision of Uncompensated Care
Nonprofit
Variables

For-profit

Number of
Admissions
38.87

Percent of
Admissions
0.07

Number of
Admissions
738.43

Percent of
Admissions
6.90

-77.61
382.01
15.71
66.32
385.07
-49.15

-3.36
1.42
0.17
0.25
3.68
-0.21

3342.12
5030.90
-484.41
-3231.54
148.01

30.07
65.76
-5.61
-45.64
1.68

-2.50

-0.19

-40.34

-0.45

ER
Teaching hospital status
Proportion with public owner
Hospital size
Proportion network/system
member

26.06
-56.88
-19.33
0.72***
-1.57**

0.22
-0.58
-0.22
0.85
-0.03

-10.85
-53.72
-40.04
0.07
-5.17

-0.19
0.92
-0.40
0.0016
-0.06

HHI
HMO penetration
Percentage of population 65+
Per capita income
Percent uninsured
Rural
2003
2004
Constant
N

172.02
-18.65
-108.47
54.48
31.11
16.60
27.78***
69.26***
-264.45

-2.04
-0.03
-0.15
-0.04
0.24
0.0022
-0.19
-0.11
7.58

-58.81
14.96
45.95
25.97
98.22
359.39
66.16***
138.09***
-9083.74

-2.42
0.76
-0.06
-0.70*
5.33
4.34
-1.41***
-0.71***
-30.29

CON
REQUIREMENT
POOL
CON*REQUIREMENT
CON*POOL
POOL*REQUIREMENT
CON*REQUIREMENT*POOL
Technology Intensity

2235

*p≤.10; **p≤.05; ***p≤.01
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Regulatory Variables
Results obtained from the GLS procedure show that controlling for other
covariates, CON laws, acting individually, have increased both the number and percent of
nonprofit hospital admissions for the uninsured. Results obtained from the HTIV
procedure yield larger estimates for the CON variable in the number of admissions model
and the same estimates in the percent of admissions model, but neither of them is
statistically significant at the conventional levels. Although there are limitations with
both the GLS and HTIV procedure, the cross validation suggests that the true effects of
CON on nonprofit hospital admissions for the uninsured is positive and may be larger
than what the GLS model predicts, indicating that nonprofit hospitals are more capable of
providing such care in states with CON laws. This finding is consistent with what the
model predicts.
Compared to nonprofit hospitals, GLS results did not show that CON laws alone
have any effect on for-profit hospital’s number of uncompensated care admissions.
However, CON laws are significantly positively related to the percent of admissions for
the uninsured by for-profit hospitals. The HTIV model yields much larger estimates for
the regulatory effects and the signs are consistent with the GLS estimates. The crossvalidation shows that CON may have a positive impact on for-profit hospital’s percent of
uninsured admissions, suggesting that for-profit hospitals in CON states tend to devote a
larger share of their resources to provide services to the uninsured. Since for-profit
hospitals perceive the failure to obtain CON as a profit loss, they might increase their
uncompensated care provision in states with such a regulation. However, given the
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limited for-profit sample and potential problem of weak identification with the HTIV
model, this result deserves further investigation.
Both the GLS and the HTIV estimation report a positive effect of the pool on
nonprofit hospitals for the number and percent of admissions for the uninsured, though
the HTIV model shows a much greater magnitude. This is consistent with our prediction
that uncompensated care pools, acting alone, lead to more nonprofit hospital admissions
for the uninsured. It suggests that nonprofit hospitals respond to price subsidies by
increasing their uncompensated care provision. For for-profit hospitals, uncompensated
care pools are found to be negatively associated with the number of admissions for the
uninsured but positively related to the percent of admissions in the GLS model. The
HTIV model did not yield consistent results with the GLS estimates. This finding is
confounding and needs further investigation given our small for-profit sample size
(N=295) and limited number of years (N=3) in the sample.
Community benefit requirement laws are found to have a positive but
insignificant impact on the number of uninsured admissions and a significant negative
effect on the percent of self-pay/charity admissions for nonprofit hospitals. The HTIV
estimation yields a negative yet insignificant impact on both the number and percent of
admissions for nonprofit hospitals. The cross-validation suggests that community benefit
requirement laws tend to decrease nonprofit hospital’s percent of uninsured admissions.
There are two possible explanations. First, nonprofit hospitals may decrease their
uncompensated care provision as a result of adjusting to the amount required by
community benefit requirement laws. If nonprofit hospitals are already providing a
higher level of uncompensated care than required by the regulation, community benefit
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requirement laws may become a non-binding constraint. Since these laws explicitly
communicate the amount of uncompensated care nonprofit hospitals should provide, they
might send a signal to those hospitals that are already providing a higher level than
expected by the community. Consequently, these hospitals decrease their uncompensated
care provision because they realize that they are unnecessarily over-producing such care.
Second, these laws may have improved preventive/primary care for the uninsured which
led to a decrease in the demand for inpatient care. Since community benefit requirement
laws typically require that nonprofit hospitals provide health promotion services, research
and education, open access to services, and community orientation in addition to
uncompensated care (Ginn & Moseley, 2006), it is possible that community benefit
requirement laws have enhanced access to preventive/primary care for the community.
As a result, there is a decrease in the overall demand for inpatient care, which might lead
to a decrease in admissions for the uninsured. Since we only have inpatient care data, we
are limited in establishing a causal link between community benefit requirement laws and
the decrease in self-pay/charity admissions. However, this remains a possibility.
These laws have led to a different result for for-profit hospitals. The GLS finding
shows that community benefit requirement laws are negatively related to the uninsured
admissions and positively associated with the percent of admissions for the uninsured
among for-profit hospitals, suggesting that the laws may decrease the total number of the
admissions but decrease the uninsured admissions less. The HTIV model shows a larger
positive effect on the percent of uninsured admissions by for-profit hospitals. The overall
evidence indicates that for-profit hospitals devote a larger share of their resources to
uncompensated care. It could be that both the overall admissions and the number of self-
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pay/charity admissions decreased as suggested by reasons such as improved overall
preventive/primary care, but for-profit hospitals devote a larger share of their resources to
uncompensated care in response to community benefit requirement laws despite such a
decrease in demand among the general population. Or as the HTIV results suggest, forprofit increase their uncompensated care provision in response to such laws. This can be
explained by reasons suggested by previous literature that for-profit hospitals treat failure
to meet community expectations as a cost. Since community benefit requirement laws
explicitly express community expectations, it is not surprising that for-profit respond to
community expectations by increasing their uncompensated care provision, even though
these laws are not intended for them. It is a profit maximizing strategy for for-profit
hospitals to increase their uncompensated care provision in the presence of community
benefit requirement laws. Again we need to be cautious about these findings given the
limitations of both the GLS and HTIV models.
Results from the estimations also show evidence of significant policy interaction
effects. The GLS model shows that CON laws and uncompensated care pools have
jointly increased nonprofit hospital’s uncompensated care provision, indicating that CON
laws and uncompensated care pools may have reinforced each other’s effectiveness for
the nonprofit hospitals. Results from the HTIV estimation provide support for this
observation. One possible explanation for this result for nonprofit hospitals is that with
CON laws creating a marketplace of less competition, price subsidies may be more
effective in encouraging hospitals to increase their provision of services to the uninsured.
We also calculated the total effect of the regulations on uninsured admissions
based on the GLS estimates. Tables 18.1-2 present results from this calculation. The
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green columns provide the parameter estimates for the total effects of the regulations on
the number/percent of admissions and the yellow columns present regulatory intensities
as discussed previously in the sample construction. For example, in Table 18.1, the first
green column represents estimated total effects for CON when states have either both
CON and pool or all three regulations and the second column reports estimated total
effects of uncompensated care pools when states have either both CON and pool or all
three regulations. The different values of CON correspond to the total effects of pool or
CON as the intensity of CON increases. Specifically, it shows that as the intensity of
CON laws increases on the intensity scale from 8.1 to 15, to 18.4, the total effects of
CON on nonprofit hospital uncompensated care provision increase from 521, to 966, to
1184 admissions for states that have both CON laws and mandatory uncompensated care
pools (POOL is evaluated at 2 on the intensity scale). For for-profit hospitals, although
the GLS estimates yields a positive association between CON laws interacted with
uncompensated care pools and number of uninsured admissions, the HTIV estimates give
the opposite results. It is possible that this discrepancy is a result of the small for-profit
sample since the HTIV procedure is sensitive to sample sizes. The consistent estimates
between the GLS and HTIV estimations for the larger nonprofit sample support this
possibility. Nevertheless, due to such limitations with our sample and methodology, we
do not have sufficient evidence to show that CON laws acting jointly with
uncompensated care pools might have a substitution effect on public subsidies.
Results from the GLS suggest that community benefit requirement laws, acting
jointly with the uncompensated care pools, have slightly increased the for-profit number
of admissions for the uninsured. However, again the HTIV estimates are inconsistent
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with the GLS results. Although it is likely that the true effects could be larger than what
the GLS model predicts, given the tendency of the GLS model to underestimate the
regulatory effect, we do not have enough evidence to substantiate this claim. Further
investigation is needed to confirm if for-profit hospitals in states with both a mandatory
pool and a moderate community benefit requirement regulation tend to have more selfpay/charity care admissions than those in states with only CON regulations.
All three policies working together were found to decrease the number of
admissions for the uninsured among nonprofit hospitals, which are supported by both the
GLS and HTIV estimates although the latter are not statistically significant. While CON
laws and uncompensated care pools have jointly increased the number of admissions for
the uninsured, adopting all three policies tends to reduce that number. As a result, the
total effect of implementing CON or uncompensated care pool results is a reduction in
uncompensated care provided by nonprofit hospitals if states adopt all three policies
(Table 18.1). One possible explanation might be that community benefit requirement
laws have reduced inpatient admissions and thus reducing nonprofit hospitals’ reliance on
public subsidies and cross-subsidization of uncompensated care. Another potential
explanation would be that if the community benefit requirement is set below the level at
which hospitals actually provide uncompensated care, it could provide a signal to reduce
their provision of care by suggesting that their prior levels of such care are above the
levels expected by the community. We, however, are not able to distinguish the impact of
the joint effects on the number or percent of admissions for the uninsured among forprofit hospitals. In our for-profit hospital sample, the interactions of three policies
working together happen to be perfectly collinear with the joint variations of CON laws
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and requirement regulations. The binary interaction was dropped out of the model and
consequently we are not able to conclude whether the parameter estimate on the threeway interactions is due to the impact of all three policies working jointly.
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Table 18.1: Total effects of Regulations on Nonprofit Hospital Provision of
Uncompensated Care (GLS)
Number of Admissions
Estimated
Total
Effects of
CON

Percent of Admissions

Estimated
Total
Effects of
Pool
when POOL=2 and

Estimated
Total
Effects of
CON
when POOL=2 and

when POOL=2 and

521.397

CON=8.1

528.836

CON=8.1

0.891

CON=8.1

965.55

CON=15

891.5

CON=15

1.65

CON=15

CON=18.4

2.024

CON=18.4

1184.408

CON=18.4

1070.204

-173.421

when POOL=2;
REQUIREMENT=3
and
CON=8.1

-135.04

when POOL=2;
REQUIREMENT=3
and
when CON=8.1

-321.15

CON=15

-337.9

when CON=15

-393.944

CON=18.4

-437.86

when CON=18.4

Table 18.2: Total effects of Regulations on For-profit Hospital Provision of
Uncompensated Care (GLS)
Number of Admissions
Estimated
Total
Effects of
Pool

Estimated
Total
Effects of
Community
Benefit
Requirement
1263.12

when POOL=2 and
REQUIREMENT=3

-28.698

when POOL=2 and
CON=6.3

508.998

CON=20.7

1126.2

when POOL=2 and
REQUIREMENT=3

To compare our results with previous studies that do not typically control for
policy interactions, we also test how our estimation results differ from prior findings.
Using the same GLS estimation, Tables 19.1-19.2 show that when CON laws alone are
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included in the model, there is a positive but insignificant impact on uncompensated care
provision by nonprofit hospitals, and a negative but insignificant effect on number of
uninsured admissions by for-profit hospitals. Both signs are in the expected direction. In
addition, we find a significant positive, yet marginal, effect on the percent of admissions
by for-profit hospitals. A one unit increase on the intensity scale is associated with a .19
percent increase in the for-profit hospital admissions for the uninsured. Uncompensated
care pools are found to significantly increase both the number and percent of
uncompensated care admissions by nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. This finding is
consistent with the existing evidence. For community benefit requirement laws, the
coefficient on the number of uncompensated care variable for nonprofit hospitals is
positive and insignificant and that for for-profit hospital is negative and significant,
which is the same with what we find when other policies and their interactions are
included. The findings are identical for the percent of uncompensated care admissions
variable with or without other policies and their interactions. These results indicate that
community benefit requirement laws tend not to be significantly influenced by CON laws
or uncompensated care pools regulations. This is reasonable given that hospitals are
expected to abide by community benefit requirement laws if they are considered as
binding requirements.
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Table 19.1: GLS: Comparing Estimates w/ and w/o Other Policy or
Interactions (Nonprofit)

Variables
CON
REQUIREMENT
POOL
CON*REQUIREMENT
CON*POOL
POOL*REQUIREMENT
CON*REQUIREMENT*POOL

W/O Other Policies or
Interactions
Number of
Percent of
Admissions
Admissions
3.26
-0.02
9.71
-0.63***
154.27***
0.88***
-

W/ Other Policies or
Interactions
Number of
Percent of
Admissions
Admissions
10.73**
0.07**
9.71
-0.63***
51.55*
0.51*
-1.91
0.02
26.82***
0.14***
46.33
0.35
-20.49***
-0.11

*p≤.10; **p≤.05; ***p≤.01

Table 19.2: GLS: Comparing Estimates w/ and w/o Other Policy or
Interactions (For-profit)

Variables
CON
REQUIREMENT
POOL
CON*REQUIREMENT
CON*POOL
POOL*REQUIREMENT
CON*REQUIREMENT*PO
OL

W/O Other Policies or
Interactions
Number of Percent of
Admission Admissions
s
-2.26
0.19*
-42.34***
0.67***
117.82***
2.15**
-

*p≤.10; **p≤.05; ***p≤.01
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W/ Other Policies or Interactions
Number of
Admissions

Percent of
Admissions

3.95
-42.34***
-131.97***
18.67***
231.69***
-19.57***

0.25***
0.69***
1.14*
0.004
-0.12
0.03

Market Characteristics
Our GLS results for the market level characteristics are largely consistent with the
previous literature. HMO penetration is found to have a significant negative impact on
the number of nonprofit hospital admissions for uninsured patients and a non-significant
negative impact on the percent of admissions for uninsured patients. The HTIV results
validate this association but the coefficients are statistically insignificant. One reason to
explain this negative relationship is that high levels of HMO penetration tend to reduce
the price for paying patients, and as a result, nonprofit hospitals have less revenue to
cross-subsidize services to the uninsured. At the same time, market penetration by HMOs
might also reduce the admissions for the insured patients, which makes the proportion of
admissions for the uninsured largely unchanged. Given our relatively small sample size
(N=295), we fail to find a significant impact of HMO penetration on the number or
percent of admissions for the uninsured among for-profit hospitals in the GLS estimation.
The HTIV procedure yields a positive effect of HMO penetration on for-profit hospitals.
Although the sign is of the expected direction, the coefficient is not statistically
significant.
The GLS results show a negative association between HHI and the for-profit
hospital’s uncompensated care provision, which is consistent with the HTIV estimate. In
other words, in markets with higher HHI, which implies higher industry concentration,
for-profit hospitals have fewer uncompensated care admissions. This finding based on the
cross-validation of both models is consistent with our prediction that for-profit hospitals
respond to higher competition by increasing their uncompensated care provision and
react to lower competition by decreasing it. A plausible explanation is higher industry
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concentration might have made paid care more expensive and hence the cost of
uncompensated care is higher. Although we fail to find a significant association between
market concentration and nonprofit hospital uncompensated care provision, this is
consistent with findings from previous studies that examine the impact of various other
regulations on hospital provision of uncompensated care (Bazzoli, Lindrooth et al. 2006).
A higher percentage of uninsured was found to be significantly associated with
more admissions for the uninsured for for-profit hospitals in the GLS estimation and
insignificant in the HTIV estimation. The percent of population over 65 was negatively
related to uncompensated care provision for nonprofit hospitals in both estimation
procedures. These results could suggest that in places where health insurance coverage
for the non-elderly is low, hospitals face greater demand for uncompensated care. Per
capita income is found to be positively related to the number of admissions for the
uninsured for for-profit hospitals in the GLS estimation. This finding is contradictory to
our prediction and merits further attention. Even though we did not find a significant
impact of the percent of uninsured on nonprofit hospital provision of uncompensated care,
this finding is consistent with results from prior studies (Bazzoli, Lindrooth et al. 2006).
Hospital Characteristics
Some hospital characteristics have also significantly influenced a hospital’s
ability to provide uncompensated care. For both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals,
technological intensity is found to be negatively related to their percent of
uncompensated care admissions in both the GLS and HTIV estimations although the
HTIV estimates are insignificant. This cross-validation could mean that hospitals that are
more technologically sophisticated have higher number of admissions for paying patients.
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One explanation for this result might be that such hospitals may provide better quality of
care than hospitals with lower technology intensity and hence attracting more paying
patients.
Not surprisingly, for both types of hospitals increasing bed size is associated with
an increasing number of admissions that are self-pay or charity. However, among forprofit hospitals, size is negatively related to the percent of admissions for the uninsured in
the GLS estimation, while we are unable to detect any effect of bed size on the share of
uncompensated admissions among non-profit hospitals. This finding was not validated
by the HTIV model and requires further investigation.
The percent of public hospitals in the market is significantly negatively related to
the number of admissions for the uninsured among nonprofit hospitals in both GLS and
HTIV estimations. This means that public hospitals may have crowded out nonprofit
hospitals in terms of their uncompensated care provision. Similarly, we find that the
higher the percent of hospitals that belong to a network/system, the lower the percent of
uncompensated care admissions by nonprofit hospitals as validated by both the GLS and
HTIV procedures. Since research indicates that hospitals within a network/system
provide more uncompensated care than those that are not in a network/system (Bazzoli,
Lindrooth et al. 2006), it is not surprising that their presence will lead to a crowd-out
effect on nonprofit hospital provision of such services. We did not, however, find any
significant impact of public hospitals or network/systems hospitals on for-profit hospitals
although both GLS and HTIV estimation yield a negative but insignificant association.
We might not have enough data to identify the effect given our sample size.
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Wrapping up, our findings from the cross-validation of the GLS and HTIV are
summarized in Table 20. The strength of the evidence was indicated by three stars
(meaning the GLS and HTIV procedures yield consistent results) or no star (meaning the
GLS and HTIV model produces inconsistent results). The table also shows whether our
results conformed to the hypotheses. Even though both the GLS and HTIV methods have
their limitations, our cross-validation provides a way to overcome some of the drawbacks.
As can be seen from the table, most of our GLS and HTIV findings are consistent and
conform to our predictions. Some of our results however need further investigation
because we do not have strong evidence to reach a conclusion.
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Table 20: Summary of Effects on Uncompensated Care Provision
Uncompensated Care
Variables

Nonprofit
Predicted

For-profit

Found

Predicted

Found

Number of
Admissions

Percent of
Admissions

Number of
Admissions

+

+***

+***

+/-

POOL

+

+***

REQUIREMENT

+

CON*POOL

+

CON* REQUIREMENT

+/-

+/-

POOL*REQUIREMENT

+/-

+/-

+

CON*POOL* REQUIREMENT

+/-

+/-

-

Percent of
Admissions

Regulatory Measures
CON

+***

+***

+***

+

-

+***

-***

+/-

-

+***

+***

+/-

+

- ***

Hospital Characteristics
Teaching hospital status

+

Percent of public hospital

-

Technology intensity

+

Hospital size

+

ER

+

Percent of network/system member

-

+
-***

+
-***

+***

+
+

+***

+
-***

+

Market Characteristics
HHI

+

HMO penetration

-

-***

+

Percentage of population aged 65
or above
Per capita income

-

-***

-

-

-

+***

Percentage of population that are
uninsured
Rural

+

+

+***

-

-
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-***

-

CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION

This chapter presents a summary of the dissertation research. The first section
summarizes the results while the second section discusses policy implications. Study
limitations and extensions for future research are provided in the last section.
Summary
This dissertation examines the effects of various state regulations on hospital
provision of uncompensated care and analyzes both for-profit and nonprofit hospitals’
responsiveness to the regulatory environment.
Despite the limitations with our data and methodology, our findings from the
cross-validation of the GLS and HTIV models suggest that nonprofit and for-profit
hospitals respond to some policy instruments similarly and others differently. For
example, our evidence suggests that both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals respond to
CON laws by increasing their uncompensated care provision. This may be partially
attributed to the fact that nonprofit hospitals behave differently in markets with different
levels of industry concentration. As suggested by the literature, nonprofit hospitals
increase their uncompensated care provision when industry concentration grows. Forprofit hospitals, although responding to CON regulations in similar ways, may view
failure to obtain CON regulations as a cost. Their increase in uncompensated care
provision is a strategy to maximize profits. Nonprofit and for-profit hospitals also
respond to policy incentives such as community benefit requirement laws differently.
These laws were found to decrease the uncompensated care provision by nonprofit
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hospitals, while increasing the provision of such care by for-profit hospitals. This is an
interesting finding suggesting that community benefit requirement laws may have sent a
signal of overproducing uncompensated care to the nonprofit hospitals that are already
providing a higher level of uncompensated care than mandated. They may have also
improved preventive/primary care for the uninsured which consequently led to a decrease
in demand for inpatient care. However, we lack primary/preventive care data to validate
such a connection. The findings also suggest that again for-profit hospitals might
consider providing uncompensated care as a profit maximizing strategy and hence
respond to community benefit requirement laws by increasing their supply of
uncompensated care. It is also plausible that in markets where nonprofit hospitals reduce
their uncompensated care provision, for-profit hospitals increase their provision of such
care. This is because a decrease in uncompensated care provision increases unmet
demand for such care, which in turn increases community expectations regard hospital
provision of uncompensated care. Since for-profit hospitals respond to an increase in
community expectations by increasing their uncompensated care provision, they might
increase such provision when nonprofit hospitals decrease it. However, it is not clear to
us if the total market level of uncompensated care has changed as a result of such a shift.
In addition to the above differences between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals,
regulations working together can in some cases enhance the effectiveness of one another.
For example, uncompensated care pools, when interacted with CON laws, have greatly
increased uncompensated care provision by nonprofit hospitals. When the three policies
are implemented together, community benefit requirement laws seem to have limited the
need for nonprofit hospitals to seek support from the uncompensated care pools or cross-
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subsidization of services. Specifically, these laws might have improved
preventive/primary care for the uninsured so that the demand for the more costly
inpatient care is reduced. As a result, nonprofit hospitals could reduce their reliance on
uncompensated care pools to reimburse for their free care. Another potential explanation
is these laws might have send a signal to nonprofit hospitals already providing a higher
level of uncompensated care than required by such a regulation to reduce their care.
Some hospital characteristics also influence uncompensated care provision by
nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. Larger hospitals tend to provide more uncompensated
care than smaller hospitals, both nonprofit and for-profit. Nonprofit hospitals that are
more technologically sophisticated tend to have a lower percentage of uncompensated
care. The presence of public hospitals and hospitals that belong to a network/system in a
local market lead to lower uncompensated care provision by nonprofit hospitals in that
same market.
Both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals respond to the market environment by
adjusting their uncompensated care provision. For-profit hospitals decrease their
uncompensated care provision when market concentration is high and increase such
provisions when uninsured populations increase. Nonprofit hospitals decrease their
uncompensated care provision when HMO penetration increases market competition.
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Policy Implications
The study results have significant implications for state health policies that aim at
improving access to care for the underinsured and uninsured. Reductions in the provision
of uncompensated care by hospitals have limited access to care for those who need it
most. Further the disproportionate distribution of the uncompensated care burden has
started to jeopardize the financial stability of some hospitals, particularly those that are
considered as safety-net hospitals for the economically disadvantaged. Understanding the
influence of the regulatory environment, especially policy interactions will help
policymakers design more complex strategies to address these important issues.
Our study has significant implications for states that do not have CON laws or are
reexamining the impact of their existing CON laws on uncompensated care provision.
Our findings indicate that both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals respond to CON laws by
increasing their uncompensated care provision. As suggested by previous literature, with
CON laws creating a marketplace of less competition, nonprofit hospitals have more
resources to cross subsidize uncompensated care. For-profit hospitals might perceive the
failure to obtain CON as a profit loss and increase their uncompensated care provision in
states with such a CON regulation. Therefore, implementing such a policy in either a
mixed ownership market or in markets dominated by nonprofit hospitals may be able to
increase access to care for the uninsured.
State policies aimed at assisting safety-net hospitals may consider providing
public subsidies in combination with regulations that explicitly communicate community
expectations. Our evidence suggests that explicit expression of community expectations
reduces the provision of uncompensated care by non-profit hospitals and results in greater
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provision of such care by for-profit hospitals. This result indicates that the new IRS
rulings on nonprofit hospital reporting of community benefits may have unintended
indirect effects on for-profit hospitals because in mixed ownership markets where
community benefit requirement laws are implemented, for-profit hospitals may provide
more uncompensated care. In markets dominated by nonprofit hospitals, implementing
community benefit requirement regulations may not increase uncompensated care
provision by nonprofit hospitals. Such regulations may send a signal to those hospitals
that are already providing a higher level of uncompensated care than expected by the
community. Consequently, these nonprofit hospitals decrease their uncompensated care
provision because they realize that they are unnecessarily over-producing such care. We
do not have enough evidence to show, however, if the total market level of
uncompensated care has changed as a result of such a shift of uncompensated care
provision from nonprofit to for-profit hospitals. The net changes in the amount of
uncompensated care at the market level will depend on the magnitude of the decrease by
nonprofit hospitals and increase by for-profit hospitals.
Implementing policies that suppress competition (e.g., CON laws) and public
subsidies (e.g., uncompensated care pools) together may increase the effectiveness of
both types of regulations for nonprofit hospitals. Because nonprofit hospitals largely rely
on cross-subsidization of services to provide uncompensated care, a less competitive
market will enhance their financial ability to do so. Further incentives from public
subsidies will increase their willingness to provide uncompensated care.
Other findings of the study indicate that there is a significant crowd-out effect by
public hospitals. Nonprofit hospitals are particularly sensitive to the amount of
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uncompensated care provided by public hospitals in the same market. They reduce their
uncompensated care when there is a large presence of public hospitals in the market.
Although public hospitals are not the focus of this study, they play a central role in
promoting health in the community. Policy makers need to understand the extent and
magnitude of the crowd-out effect in order to write appropriate policy prescriptions to
support safety-net hospitals.
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Study Limitations and Future Research
The current study benefited from our ability to examine various regulations using
comprehensive information on admissions for the uninsured, an improved alternative
measure of uncompensated care. However, important limitations must be noted.
First, despite being a powerful technique to correct endogeneity as a result of
latent individual effects, the HTIV procedure suffers from weak identification due to our
data limitations. Although we cross-validate results using a random effects GLS, future
studies will benefit from obtaining data that have more variations for some time-varying
variables so as to improve the HTIV estimation.
Second, our measures of the regulatory variables do not capture all the variations
of the policies under investigation, so we are unable to completely eliminate the potential
confounding factor ---- state effects. In other words, the lack of such a precise measure
limits our ability to completely separate the effects of being in a particular state and the
effects of the regulations. Future efforts should focus on conducting surveys with the
states to collect data on all dimensions of each regulation (e.g., scope, length,
restrictiveness and uncertainty). Methods to operationalize these dimensions also deserve
further attention.
Another limitation of the study is the lack of hospital discharge data on other nonstudy states. Although our study represents a comprehensive analysis of these regulations
using uncompensated care admission as a measure, we only have data on 17 states.
Selection bias remains a potential problem even though we have good reasons to believe
that HCUP participating and non-participating states are not systematically different in
terms of their uncompensated care provision. In addition, because we worked with only
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17 states, the lack of variation on the regulatory measures limits our ability to examine a
broader scope of policies such as conversion and AWP-FOC laws. Future studies should
identify datasets with information on more states to obtain greater variation on the entire
spectrum of policies.
It is also important to note that neither the Hausman-Taylor nor the random
effects GLS procedure corrects for the bias as a result of reverse causality if we suspect
that such bias indeed exists. In other words, hospitals might have endogenously selected
themselves into different programs based on their level of uncompensated care. In such
cases, a propensity score matching technique might prove useful. Intuitively, the
propensity score matching constructs a control group from the group of untreated
individuals and ensures that the control group is as similar as possible as the treatment
group with respect to observable characteristics that affect both the outcome and the
treatments. Matching has some important advantages over the Hausman-Tayor
procedure. As a non-parametric method, matching does not impose any specific linearity
assumptions on the evaluated effects that are inherent in regression-based modeling.
Furthermore, matching explicitly tries to find for each untreated unit a similar treated unit
to evaluate the counterfactual, i.e. what would happen to the treatment group without the
treatment. If sample selection remains a concern, additional information on policy
adoption needs to be collected. Unfortunately, these data were not available at the time of
the study. However, since our unit of analysis is the individual hospital and the adoption
of various regulations by the states might be influenced by the magnitude of the
uncompensated care at the state level, such endogeneity problems might be mitigated.
Another reason to believe that reverse causality will not significantly bias our results is
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that policy adoptions are unlikely to be correlated with recent level of hospital
uncompensated care provision. Most our states adopted these regulations several decades
ago. Even if a state’s decision to adopt these policies was based on its level of
uncompensated care, it is more likely to be determined by the aggregated level of
uncompensated care then. In other words, regulations do not correlate with the level of
uncompensated care during the same time periods. Nevertheless, future research needs to
control for the first stage selection using data containing information that predicts
adoption.
Additional concern about endogeneity lies in the potential spillover effects. In
other words, states with policies that encourage uncompensated care provision might
attract the uninsured from adjacent states with less friendly polices to seek care from their
hospitals. As information on patient origin for the self-pay/charity care patients is missing
from our data, we are unable to examine the proportion of patients that are from a
contiguous state with less generous uncompensated care policies. However, we do not
expect that such a spillover, if it indeed exists, will significantly bias our results. The
uninsured tend to seek care locally for three main reasons. First and foremost, they
typically delay care until symptoms worsen to the point when they end up being admitted
into an ER in a local hospital. Second, they lack the information about which hospitals
provide charity care, not to mention which states have more uninsured-patients-friendly
policies. Third, the uninsured might not be able to afford travelling to another state to
seek care, given that they typically have very low income.
Finally, we had access only to inpatient data, which limited our ability to analyze
the regulatory effects on primary/preventive care. For example, if a particular bundle of
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regulations (e.g., community benefit requirements and uncompensated care pools)
encourages hospitals to provide primary/preventive care to the underserved population,
we were not able to empirically test if the decrease in uncompensated care admissions is
due to the effect of that incentive. Future research should focus on incorporating data on
primary/preventive care to capture the intermediate effect of these regulations so that we
are able to not only assess the full spectrum of the regulatory effects but also improve our
understanding of the mechanisms by which each regulation or a bundle of regulations
influences uncompensated care provision for the underinsured and uninsured populations.
Future work should focus on obtaining more data on HMO penetration, percent of
population over 65, and uninsurance rate so that there will be real changes over time for
the HTIV method to yield robust instruments. Furthermore, model identification could
also be improved by adopting the county based market measure. Using patient flows to
define market has the potential for endogeneity bias when we investigate the effects of
competition on hospital cost and outputs (Wong, Zhan et al. 2005). Since our market
groups were constructed based on hospital admissions and the dependent variable is also
admissions, it is likely that our market level variables are correlated with the random
error term. Given that the HTIV procedure is sensitive to endogeniety, we should be able
to obtain improved estimates with an exogenous county based market measure. Finally,
we should further adjust admissions by case-mix to account for the intensity of resource
use so that our measure could better reflect the actual hospital effort for uncompensated
care. As suggested by some studies comparing adjusted and unadjusted utilization
measures, case mix has significantly affected the level of hospital resource use (Weiner,
Starfield et al. 1991; Berlowitz, Ash et al. 1998; Liu, Sales et al. 2003; Lee and Roh
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2007). Future work should include in the empirical model a case mix severity measure
from the discharge data using the ICD codes.
In conclusion, despite the limitations, our study represents a comprehensive
examination of competition (CON), subsidy (uncompensated care pool) and requirement
(community benefit requirement) regulations that have the most influence on hospital
uncompensated care provision. It overcomes the limits of previous research that focused
primarily on the effect of a single regulation in a given state. The current study not only
improves generalizability by examining hospitals in 17 U.S. states, it also investigates
multiple policy interventions and their interactions, which are argued to be crucial in
understanding the impact of the regulatory environment on hospitals provision of
uncompensated care. In addition, the current study improves upon measures of
uncompensated care using a more direct measure of the actual care delivered to the
uninsured --- admissions for self-pay/charity patients. Findings from this study suggest
that nonprofit and for-profit hospitals view and respond to policy incentives differently.
In addition, regulatory interactions are found to significantly influence the
uncompensated care provision by both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. The study helps
improve policy maker’s understanding of the impact of the regulatory environment on
nonprofit and for-profit hospital behaviors and their uncompensated care provision. It
contributes to the current debate over the new IRS ruling on community benefit reporting
for tax exempt nonprofit hospitals.
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APPENDIX A
REGULATORY VARIATIONS
The following table presents study regulations for all 48 U.S. states.
Table B.1: Hospital Regulations in 48 U.S. States (by 2007)
States
Alabama

CON
X

Duration
1979-

X

19711985
1975-

Arizona*
Arkansas†
California
Colorado*

19731978-

Florida*

X

1973-

Georgia

X

1974-

X

19801983
1974-

X

19801996,
19971999
1977-

Kentucky*

X

19721985
1972-

†

Louisiana

X

1991-

Maine*

X

1978-

Illinois

Iowa*
Kansas

POOL

Duration

CONVERSION

X

1992-

X

1997- effective, passed
in 1994

X

1988-

X

X

1983-The Reform
Act for Provision
of Care to the
Medically Indigent
1991-1994

X

2001-

X

X
X

1994- reporting

X

HCI

X

X

1968-

X

2001-

X

1974-

X

1972-

X

1994-voluntary

X

1985-1988, 19891991, 1992-1997,
1998-

Michigan

X

1972-

X

19711985
1979-

X

Mississippi
Missouri

X

1979-

X

Montana

X

1975-

X

1979-

AWP
Duration

X

1995-

1995-

X

1976-

X

1994-

X

1994-

X

1994-

X

1994-

X

1995-

X

1984-

X

1991-1993
X

Nevada*

X

1971-

X

2005-

X

1979-

X

New Jersey*

2000- effective, passed
in 1999

X

1971-

X

19781983
1966-

New York*

FOC
Duration

1994- Access

New Hampshire

New Mexico

AWP/FOC

X

X

Massachusetts*

Nebraska†

Duration

1984-1996
X

Maryland*

Minnesota

†

X

X
X

Indiana

*

X

Delaware

Duration

X

19691987
19731987

Connecticut

Idaho

REQUIREMENT

X

X

Property tax funded

X

1980-1993, 1993-

X

X
X

1991- general

1996-

X

Study state
Long-term care facility only
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X
1974-1997, 1997-

1979-

Appendix B: Continued

States
North Carolina*

CON
X

Duration
1978-

X
X

North Dakota
Ohio

X

19711995
1975-

Oklahoma

X

1971-

Oregon†*

X

1971-

†

Pennsylvania

1999- effective, passed
in 1997

X

1993- mini

X

1971-

X

19721988
1973-

Vermont

X

19751985
19791984
1979-

Virginia

X

1973-

Utah*

Washington

*

X

1971-

West Virginia*

X

1977-

Wisconsin†*

X

19771987,
199319771989

Wyoming
Total

†

X

South Carolina

Texas

*

1997-mini

1968-

34

POOL

Duration

CONVERSION

Duration

AWP/FOC

FOC
Duration

X

1985-

X

1996-

X

1975-

AWP
Duration

X
X

X

Tennessee

Duration
2005-

19791996

Rhode Island*

South Dakota

REQUIREMENT
X

X
X

1992-

X
X
X

SLH 1946-1989,
1989-

X

Property tax funded

X

1983-

X
X
X
18

18

Study state
Long-term care facility only
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12

15

19751990-

APPENDIX B
MARKET DEFINITION
To define markets by patient flow, we use the HCUP SID data to implement the
following algorism 18. We first determined patients’ origin by their zip code and the
county/counties that correspond to that zip code. We then found the hospitals they
attended and the county/counties that correspond to those hospitals. We defined markets
as county/counties that sent at least 50 percent of its patients to another county. As a
result, all counties that share the initial market were grouped.
Counties that do not belong to any markets after the initial grouping were then
added to the market groups if a county sent at least 21 percent of its patients to a county
that is already in a market. Counties that belong to multiple markets were then placed
into the market to which it sent its largest number of patients greater than 21 percent.
After all markets were defined, smaller markets were absorbed into larger markets if the
combination of the markets was logical in terms of spatial proximity and patient flow.
For example, Maryland has 24 counties with 22 counties that have hospitals in our
sample 19. In the first step, Allegany and Garrett were grouped in the same market since
98 percent of Allegany patients were from Garrett. Baltimore county and Baltimore city
were put in the same market as 70 percent of Baltimore county patients were from
Baltimore city. After the initial grouping, we have 12 market groups and three counties

18

We use counties as markets for Nevada, New York, and Rhode Island since either zip code or patient
unique identifier/medical records are missing for these three states. For Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine,
West Virginia and Utah, we use the first three digits of patients’ zip codes to determine the county-tocounty patient flow table.
19
Queen Anne’s and Caroline counties do not have hospitals in our sample, so we did not include those
counties in our market groups.
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(Talbot, Kent and Dochester) that were not assigned to any markets (as shown by the
Figure 2). As Kent and Dochester sent most their patients (40 and 55 percent) to Talbot
respectively, we grouped them in the same market. Baltimore county belongs to both
Baltimore city market and Howard county market, and it sent its largest number of
patients greater than 21 percent to its own Baltimore county market. Baltimore city sent
95 percent and Howard County sent 52 percent of their patients to Baltimore county. We
therefore group Baltimore county and Baltimore city in the same market. Smaller
markets such as Somerset were absorbed into the larger Wicomico/ Worcester market
because geographically Somerset borders both counties and it sent a significant number
of patients (86 percent) to Wicmico and the remaining 14 percent to Worcester. Calvert
was absorbed into the Prince George’s market and Howard/Carrol market was absorbed
into Baltimore county/Baltimore city market for similar reasons. As a result of all the
groupings, we ended up with 10 hospital market groups for Maryland.
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APPENDIX C
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS: MARKET DEFINED BY PATIENT
FLOW VS. COUNTY
We performed a sensitivity analysis to test if our results are sensitive to different
market measures. Table C.1 defines each market measure. Table C.2 shows that mean
market concentration is higher for the county based definition than the patient flow based
market definition. Tables C.3-4 represents results from including different HHI measures
in otherwise identical hospital uncompensated care admission regressions. The
parameter estimates for the regulatory variables are remarkably similar in sign although
the level of significance differs slightly. The estimated effects were much lower in
absolute value for variables such as CON, CON*POOL and all three variables interacted
in the county model than that in the patient flow model, and the magnitude of
uncompensated care pool variable is much higher in the county model. In addition, the
parameter estimates on the HHI variables were largely similar in sign and magnitude,
which is consistent with what Wong et al. (2005) find in their analysis. Their study shows
that competition measures based on the geographic boundary definitions and the widely
used patient flow definitions yielded the highest correlations with other measures and that
empirical studies examining the impact of market competition on hospital costs or
outputs are insensitive to the choice of hospital competition measure employed. Lastly,
most control variables in both models have the similar signs and effect sizes.
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Table C.1: Definition: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
Variable
Definition
HHI_market Herfindahl-Hirschman Index based on patient flow
HHI_county Herfindahl-Hirschman Index based on county

Table C.2: Summary Statistics for HHI by Sample and Definition
Sample w/
Technology
Intensity and
ER
Sample w/o
Technology
Intensity and
ER

For-profit
Nonprofit
For-profit
Nonprofit

Variable
HHI_county
HHI_market
HHI_county
HHI_market
HHI_county
HHI_market
HHI_county
HHI_market

Obs
295
295
2235
2235
500
500
2625
2625

125

Mean
4375.01
2571.69
5233.36
3176.62
4099.15
2460.18
5091.12
3165.10

Std. Dev.
3154.32
2430.33
3425.55
2953.97
3304.05
2433.56
3421.31
2930.38

Min
534.05
316.95
513.36
316.95
513.36
316.95
513.36
316.95

Max
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000

Table C.3: GLS Results for Hospital Provision of Uncompensated Care
(Patient Flows)
Variables
CON
REQUIREMENT
POOL
CON*REQUIREMENT
CON*POOL
POOL*REQUIREMENT
CON*REQUIREMENT*
POOL

Nonprofit
Number of
Percent of
Admissions
Admissions
10.73**
0.07**
9.71
-0.63***
51.55*
0.51*
-1.91
0.02
26.82***
0.14***
46.33
0.35
-20.49***
-0.11

For-profit
Number of
Percent of
Admissions
Admissions
3.95
0.25***
-42.34***
0.69***
-131.97***
1.14*
18.67***
0.004
231.69***
-0.12
-19.57***
0.03

Technology Intensity
ER
Teaching hospital status
Proportion with public
owner
Hospital size
Proportion
network/system member

35.57
19.61
56.27
-2383.43***

-0.26**
0.28
0.22
-7.35

39.37
51.08
-28.81
-872.67

-0.36**
0.19
-0.18
-1.66

1.60***
-191.01

-0.001
-2.79*

0.97***
-254.34

-0.004***
-6.12

HHI
HMO penetration
Percentage of population
65+
Per capita income
Percent uninsured
Rural
2003
2004
Constant
N

-0.01
-214.63***
-11.23***

-0.00002
-1.68
-0.06

-0.01**
-123.36
0.25

0.00003
2.87
-0.08

-2.27
3.42
-0.56
37.17**
81.56***
123.27

-0.004
0.17
0.02
0.07
0.18
3.78***

8.03**
36.24***
-19.28
34.40**
108.85***
-578.55***

0.06
0.06
0.67
0.34
1.07
-2.48

2235

126

295

Table C.4: GLS Results for Hospital Provision of Uncompensated Care Controlling
for Technology Intensity and ER (County)
Nonprofit
Variables

CON
REQUIREMENT
POOL
CON*REQUIREMENT
CON*POOL
POOL*REQUIREMENT
CON*REQUIREMENT*POOL
Technology Intensity
ER

Teaching hospital status
Proportion with public owner
Hospital size
Proportion network/system
member
HHI
HMO penetration
Percentage of population 65+
Per capita income
Percent uninsured
Rural
2003
2004
Constant
N

For-profit

Number of
Admissions
7.97
-14.96
85.60**
0.07
23.91***
-35.59
-15.46***

Percent of
Admissions
0.06**
-0.86***
0.40
0.03
0.14***
0.16
-0.10**

Number of
Admissions
1.77
-24.49*
34.93
-1.99
49.93
-3.30

Percent of
Admissions
0.22***
0.77***
1.80***
-0.05
-1.09
0.10*

37.00
18.36
40.47
-1447.31**
1.56***
-13.26

-0.27**
0.28
0.09
-7.85
-0.001*
-1.21

39.05
52.02
-33.88
-370.30
1.00***
-168.69***

-0.38**
0.21
-0.13
-6.91
-0.004***
-2.64

-0.01
-163.94*
-1393.22***
-3.26
6.58
0.77
38.86*
82.59***
165.35
2235

-0.0001
-1.96
-10.50
-0.01
0.18
-0.004
0.06
0.17
4.97

0.01
-89.19
-445.78**
10.41***
26.35
-26.03
32.57**
109.14**
-548.45**
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0.0002***
-0.50
-10.33***
0.08
0.02
0.52
0.33
1.07
-1.55
295

APPENDIX D
THE RURAL/URBAN CONTINUUM CODES
The Rural/Urban Continuum Codes are defined as follows:

CODE

METROPOLITAN COUNTIES (1-3)

01

Counties of metro areas of 1 million population or more

02

Counties in metro areas of 250,000 - 1,000,000 population

03

Counties in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population

NONMETROPOLITAN COUNTIES (4-9)
04

Urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area

05

Urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area

06

Urban population of 2,500-19,999, adjacent to a metro area

07

Urban population of 2,500-19,999, not adjacent to a metro area

08

Completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro area

09

Completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metro area

99

Missing Value

128

APPENDIX E
DISTRIBUTION OF HOSPITALS BY OWERSHIP TYPES

Figure E.1: Percent of Hospitals by Ownership Types 2002

Figure E.2: Percent of Hospitals by Ownership Types 2003
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Figure E.3: Percent of Hospitals by Ownership Types 2004
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APPENDIX F
COMPARING SAMPLE WITH U.S. STATISTICS
Table F.1: Two Sample t Test --- Nonprofit Hospitals
Variable

Obs

Mean

Sample
U.S.

5
5

0.2
0.2

diff

5

Std. Err.

Std. Dev.

[95%
Conf.

Interval]

0.0249 0.055678 0.130867 0.269133
0.029326 0.065574 0.118579 0.281421

2.98E- 0.020736 0.046368 -0.05757 0.057574
09
mean(diff) = mean(var1 - var2)
t = 0.0000
Ho: mean(diff) = 0
degrees of freedom =
4
Ha: mean(diff) < 0
Ha: mean(diff) != 0
Ha: mean(diff) > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.5000
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 1.0000
Pr(T > t) = 0.5000

Table F.2: Two Sample t Test --- For-profit Hospitals
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Err.

var1
var2

5
5

0.202
0.2

0.06127 0.137004 0.031888 0.372113
0.047749 0.106771 0.067427 0.332573

diff

5

0.002

0.032465 0.072595

mean(diff) = mean(var1 - var2)
Ho: mean(diff) = 0
Ha: mean(diff) < 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.5231

Std. Dev.

[95%
Conf.

-0.08814

Interval]

0.092138

t = 0.0616
degrees of freedom =
4

Ha: mean(diff) != 0
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.9538

131

Ha: mean(diff) > 0
Pr(T > t) = 0.4769

APPENDIX G
Table I.1: Hospital Provision of Uncompensated Care by Type of Ownership
(Pooled OLS)
Nonprofit
Variables

For-profit

Number of
Admissions
4.939*

Percent of
Admissions
0.047*

Number of
Admissions
6.58

Percent of
Admissions
0.33***

2.295

-0.627**

-29.71

0.44

POOL

102.322***

0.426

-162.14**

1.50*

CON*REQUIREMENT
CON*POOL
POOL*REQUIREMENT
CON*REQUIREMENT*POOL

-0.598
27.864***
-4.547
-18.596***

0.030
0.212***
0.655
-0.153***

23.59***
246.09
-27.84**

-0.06
-1.46
0.09

Teaching hospital status

114.729***

0.102

-187.14***

-1.27**

-1421.311***

4.517

-2128.67***

-6.68

1.904***

-0.002***

1.83***

-0.005***

-316.237**

-4.582***

-48.57

-0.42

-0.007

-0.0001

-0.03***

-0.0000003

-293.959***

-2.148***

-105.19

5.97***

Percentage of population 65+

-7.761**

-0.038

-0.32

-0.14***

Per capita income

-4.156***

-0.021

7.79**

0.06

Percent uninsured

9.870**

0.169***

38.51***

-0.07

-3.997

0.058

-18.41

0.82***

40.473*
84.793***
144.676

-0.042
0.205
4.127***

41.01
106.42***
-566.86***

0.38
1.08**
-2.00

CON
REQUIREMENT

Proportion with public owner
Hospital size
Proportion network/system
member
HHI
HMO penetration

Rural
2003
2004
Constant
N

2322
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